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FOREWORD
In 1977, «Legal Decisions and Information Systems», written
by Jon Bing and Trygve Harvold, was published by Norwegian University
Press.
During subsequent discussions with North-Holland Publishing
Company, there emerged an interest in a larger-sized, comprehensive
and detailed Handbook, in which on the one hand the theoretical base
would be broadened and updated, and on the other hand the descriptive
coverage of retrieval systems around the world would be enlarged and
brought up to date as well.
The result of these endeavours, for which Norwegian University
Press kindly granted permission, now lies before you.
As testified to under «Acknowledgements», the generous help
from a sizeable group of persons from many countries has been
indispensable to us.
Further, recent work of the Norwegian Research Center for
Computers and Law has been incorporated into the general parts (I and
II), derived for instance from Jon Bing's thesis on legal
communication processes, and Tove Fjeldvig and Trygve Harvold's work
on the principles of text retrieval. Robert Svoboda has contributed
with his practical experience from a large number of European
operational systems in various countries.
The international survey has been greatly expanded and covers
currently 25 countries. A historical introduction and a section on
international organisations have been added. Also the survey of
research in text retrieval has been enlarged.
It must be appreciated, however, that the book does not claim to
be complete or correct in all details.
We hope that readers finding omissions, errors and
misunderstandings will not hesitate to communicate these to the
authors at the address of NRCCL (given at the end of the Foreword). We
would also appreciate to be made aware of relevant literature,
including newsletters published by legal information services for the
benefit of their users. North-Holland has indicated that there may
be a possibility for later editions of this Handbook, and we certainly
will appreciate the possibility not only to report on further
developments, but also to amend and further update the descriptions of
the different systems.
This book is the result of team-work. For practical reasons, Jon
Bing has written the text giving it a uniform style, while using
contributions from the other authors - especially in Part II.
This implies that the book is written by someone not having
English as his mother-tongue. This will be obvious from the
idiosyncracies of the text. We hope the users will excuse the lack of
elegance and the «nordicisms» of grammar, choice of words, etc.
The whole production up to a camera-ready copy has been made in
Oslo. This implies also that the manuscript has been proof-read in
Oslo - under the same limitations. We are painfully aware of the fact
that there still are too many errors in the text, reflecting that the
proof-reading proved to be a process we had grossly underestimated
in terms of time and resources. However, without the expert help of
Gunnar Bach, we would have been completely lost.
The production of this book has been organised as a project within
the NRCCL research programme NORIS. The project has been partially
funded by outside sources. We would like to thank the Royal Norwegian
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF, which has funded
the NRCCL studies of text retrieval over the past years, the Bergen
Bank Foundation which has made a study trip possible in 1983, and Emil
Mostue who has made it possible for NRCCL to subscribe to several
foreign legal information retrieval services. We also would like to
thank our friends and colleagues for support and encouragement, which
one more has proved the value of working within the framework of
collective enthusiasm at the NRCCL.
Lastly, we would like to thank Dr. K. Michielsen of
North-Holland for his support and patience through the several years
that this book has been in the making.
Skillebekk, March 1984.
Address: Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law,
University of Oslo,
Niels Juels Gt. 16,
N-0272 Oslo 2,
Norway.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In writing this book, we have had the benefit of advice, comments
and information from many sources and in many forms. We would like in
general to thank all our friends around the world and in Norway who
have helped us to collect information. They are not the ones who
should be blamed for eventual misrepresentations or omissions in the
text, rather they have been instrumental in preventing these faults
from being even graver.
Though we cannot mention individually all those who have
contributed in some way or the other, we would like to thank the
following persons for commenting directly on draft versions of text
sections:
Directeur Louis Barbel, Centre de documentation et d'informatique,
Paris; Professor Roger Brown, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania;
York Brusse, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bonn; Professor Yaacov
Choueka, Bar-Ilan University, Israel; Director Costantino Ciampi,
Istituto per la documentazione giuridica, Florence; Lecturer Marc
Fallon, Universite de Louvain; Margaret Anne Foster, Canadian Law
Books Ltd.; Sven Yves Poullet, Centre de Recherches «Informatique
et Droit», Facultés universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix,
Namur; Professor Bryan Niblett, Department of Computer Science,
University College of Swansea; Anja Oskamp, Computer/Law Institute,
Free University of Amsterdam; Professor Gerald Salton, Department of
Computer Science, Cornell University; Stephen Saxby, Faculty of Law,
University of Southampton; Professor Peter Seipel, Swedish Law
and Informatics Research Institute, University of Stockholm; Professor
Guy Vandenberghe, Interfacultair Centrum voor Management,
Rijksuniversiteit Gent.
PART I: LEGAL DECISION AN COMMUNICATION PROCESSES
[Page 1 ]
1 CONTEXT OF RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS
In this book we will deal with legal information services. By this
we mean services designed for bringing the legal information of
statutes, regulations, cases etc to the lawyer. These services take
many forms. The conventional services are often provided by a
publishing house, using the vessle of a book or a journal to bridge
the gap to the user. The more innovative services have introduced
computer technology, and this book is mainly addressed to the
possibilities and problems of such services.
It may not be quite as obvious that the context of these services
also need to be described. We think, however, that it is essential to
be aware of, and have a clear understanding of, the environment of the
legal information services.
This environment may be regarded as created by two interlocking
processes, the communication process and the decision
process.
By the communication process we indicate the process by
which information is made available to the user. This process
generally involves the provider of the service, an editoral staff and
a number of activities which result in the possibility of a user to
subscribe to a service, and employ this for retrieving legal
information which may help to solve legal problems.
The decision process is the process by which a user actually
retrieves the information and applies it in solving a legal problem or
in formulating a legal opinion.
One may say that the communication process is the description of
how the user acquires information, while the decision process is the
description of what the user does with this information. These two
processes have, however, one important element in common, namely the
information system proper: that mechanism which makes it possible to
wring information
[Page 3 ]
out of the volumes of case reporters or disk drives of a data
base.
Information services are designed for one thing: to make the user
able to make his legal decisions in a better way. The aim of
the legal information service is identical with the aim of the legal
decision process itself - to make better legal decision. The
main point is, of course, that it is not obvious what a "good" legal
decision really is.
In principle this is an important problem. As we are concerned with
legal information services, we would like to assess such services and
decide which one is the better. In order to do so, we have to have a
scale by which to measure them. As this is related to "good"
decisions, we are at a loss if we are not able to decide which one of
two decisions is the better. We will then also have problems - at
least ultimately - in deciding which one of two information services
is the better.
In other works this method has been pursued, cfr especially
Bing/Harvold 1977:225-259 and Bing 1982:188-279.
In this book we shall not attack the goals on this general and,
perhaps, slightly abstract level. We will take the goals one level
down, and maintain that a "good" legal decision is a decision which
follows the rules to which decisions have to comply. Such rules - the
norms of legal decision making - may also be quite vague and often
implicit. But in our model of a legal decision process, we shall try
to disclose such rules of importance to legal information services. By
tracing the relations between these rules and legal information
services, we also set some standards for such services.
In the chapter dealing with legal communication
[Page 4 ]
processes, we shall also introduce goals on an even less general
level: what we shall term functional efficiency. This will
describe the functional performance of a given information system and
- if the relations between these functions and the decision process
have been established - make this more specific goal meaningful as
well.
In describing the context of legal information services, we shall
commence with a description of the most basic one - the legal decision
process. We shall then move on to describe how this may be attached to
the legal communication process. Finally, we shall discuss in this
part of the book the relations between the use and the cost of
retrieval systems.
This part of the book will be quite general. The models have been
developed for sufficent flexibility to handle both computerized and
traditional legal information services. We shall, however, consciously
try to develop them in order to bring out the characteristics of
computerized services, which are the subject of this book.
We would like to point out that though we have tried to make these
models general, they are naturally formed on the basis of Norwegian
legal theory and tradition. This is an important reservation. Also, a
strong reservation is implied in the term "model". We do not attempt
to describe physical or psychological processes as they may occur in
reality, but rather model them into a sequence of elements with
specified interrelations for analytical purposes.
[Page 5 ]
2 DECISION PROCESSES
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of presenting a model of legal decision processes is to
specify and relate the different elements of such a process. It is
intended to reflect an uncontroversial picture of how a legal decision
process is organized, by using a presumably untraditional approach.
The elements specified in the model will frequently seem quite
trivial to the lawyer, and may actually be just intuitive leaps of the
mind. Consequently it may seem rather unrealistic to try to portray
them in a model. Also, the model grossly understates the interaction
between the different elements when a problem is being worked out in
the mind of a lawyer. The content of any element may not be determined
until a decision finally is reached - only then is a balance
established which makes it possible to analyse the decision. For
representational purposes, we shall describe the process as if it had
one beginning and one end.
Though the approach has certain limitations, we think it is also
useful when discussing elements of the decision process - as for
instance the retrieval process. The model elucidates the relationship
between this and other elements, making it possible to discuss terms
which otherwise may remain vague or imprecise.
In presenting the model, we shall bear in mind the purpose of this
book. Consequently, we shall explore the anatomy of the decision
process with our attention centered on the retrieval process. Other
elements will be sketched, but not in detail. For a more comprehensive
description, cfr Bing 1975.
[Page 6 ]
2.2 Initiation
A legal problem is something that emerges out of the interaction
between humans, or between humans and the environment. It is part of a
society, and exists by itself before it is brought to the notice of a
lawyer. We are, of course, only concerned with the legal problems
brought to the notice of a lawyer, either by a client who experiences
the problem, or by the activity of the lawyer himself (who may be a
legal researcher).
The problem concerns one or more persons whom we shall call "the
client". In order to initiate the decision process, the client must
contact a lawyer. This is in itself an observation of some importance,
as the initiative of the client presupposes that he is aware of the
legal nature of his problem.
For the purpose of this book, we use the term "lawyer" to denote
all persons working with legal problems, regardless of their formal
education or degrees. Civil servants will, in this sense, generally be
"lawyers" as they deal with cases to be decided by legal norms. For
the sake of simplicity, we also restrict our description of the
problems to those part of a typical client-lawyer relationship, though
the discussion might easily be extended to include also those
"problems" defined by the lawyer himself (with himself as the
"client"), as would be the case of the academic lawyer homing in on
the problems implied by a distinction made in a statute.
The lawyer himself is not part of the problem, but rather a sort of
spectator giving advice to his client. His contact with the problem is
indirect - the private lawyer through his client, the civil servant
through a citizen. A judge also has a "client" - who is not, of
course, one of the contesting parties before the court, but rather the
case presented jointly by these parties.
The problem, as experienced by the client, is not
[Page 7 ]
primarily classified as "legal". The first step of the lawyer is
to determine whether the problem - as presented to him through his
client - is legal or partially legal. This is not as trivial as it may
appear. If the client complains of bad health, inferior housing, a
nagging spouse and an unsound economy, it is not obvious that the best
remedies are an invalidity pension, housing grants and a divorce. The
legal problem may be part of a more complex problem situation - or,
indeed, a symptom of other problems. The client may perhaps be better
aided by medical care, retraining and martial advice rather than
extensive legal assistance.
As a lawyer, one is nevertheless restricted to isolating the legal
problems of the totality. This presupposes that the lawyer can
identify a legal problem, which will be of second nature to a lawyer
and in most cases quite trivial. The lawyer is an expert with
background knowledge of the legal system - and consequently he is able
to grasp the legal problems that are part of the totality. As a
characteristic, one may say that a problem is "legal" if legal
arguments may contribute towards its solution. This is a pragmatic
characterization, but it will suffice for our purpose.
Looking a bit closer at the nature of a "legal problem",
one may specify at least three typical examples:
- (1) There exists valid norms prescribing that problems of a
certain type may be solved by legal reasoning. Typical examples are
decisions by the courts or by the public administration - statutes
governing these activities will imply that decisions are the results
of legal decision processes.
- (2) The problem is in the form of a dispute which may be brought
before the court (or a similar agency for deciding disputes, as
mentioned under (1)). The possibility of a trial will throw a shadow
across the problem and make a legal decision the normal solution even
when the case is settled out of court.
- (3) The parties (or the environment) accept that a legal decision
process is a valid way of
[Page 8 ]
settling the problem. This agreement will depend on
several factors, for instance the social prestige or authority of the
lawyer in question or of lawyers in general, the effectivness of a
legal decision process (which is a rather effective way of arriving at
a solution) etc.
[Page 9 ]
2.3 The facts of the case
2.3.1 The probable facts of the case
When a lawyer has decided which are the legal issues of his
client's problem, he sets out to describe the facts of the case.
Having no direct knowledge of the problem, he has to rely on evidence
- primarily discussions with his client, but also with other persons
concerned with the problem, through examination of documents etc.
Some facts will be evident (like the identity of his client). But
here a few meta-norms prescribe how the lawyer is to arrive at the
probable facts of the case.
The term "meta-norm" is, for the purpose of this book,
used for all norms governing the legal decision and
communication processes. This is in contrast to norms of a substantive
nature, which prescribe the possible solutions to the initial problem.
Meta-norms will consequently define or determine the outline of legal
decision processes. We are aware of the fact that meta-norms
themselves may be of different categories, but feel that this
terminology will be adequate for our purposes.
The meta-norms relevant for determining the probable facts of the
case, are relative to the position of the lawyer. Under Norwegian law,
a judge has to ascertain that the factual aspects of a case is
sufficiently documented before making a decision (cfr rl sect 190,
strpl sect 331(5)). A similar obligation is prescribed for the civil
servant (cfr fvl sect 13), and if the case is not adequately
documented, the decision may be deemed void.
Perhaps more important, there are also meta-norms governing what is
permitted as evidence. In Norwegian law, these norms are few and of
little practical importance, and restricted to a few topics like the
question of whether evidence secured by illegal means
[Page 10 ]
may be allowed in court. In general the judge or the lawyer may
take into consideration what is thought appropriate. In other legal
systems, especially in the Anglo-American systems, the law of evidence
plays a more prominent role in determining the probable facts of the
case.
The general rule is, of course, that the lawyer takes into account
what he finds probable based on general human knowledge. When in
doubt, he will choose the set of facts most likely to be true. It may
also be worth noting that the assessment is not linked directly with
formal probability theory, even when this is applicable. Thus the
lawyer's view of what is probable may differ from what follows from a
strict mathematical argument.
Attitudes of a different nature may also be introduced at this
stage of the process - for instance the meta-norm of client
loyality. The lawyer will quite naturally be inclined to accept
the version of the facts presented to him by his client, even when
another version may appear more likely. Having a client implies an
obligation for looking after the interests of the client, which may
very well lead to arguments for a set of unlikely circumstances being
true. Also, the loyality to the client may influence the assessment of
what is probable.
The sort of influence exemplified by client loyality may be
regarded as a feedback-loop from later stages of the decision process,
indicating the dynamic nature of the process somewhat lost in our
model.
2.3.2 The proven facts of the case
The law of evidence may already have introduced some discrepancy
between what is "probable" in the commonly understood sense of the
word, and what is "probable" based on the admissable evidence. But
most legal systems add another layer of refinement to this, and
introduce special qualifications in respect to probability. A set of
facts is not regarded as proven unless it is qualified more
probable than any other set of facts. The meta-norms govern the
burden of proof, and they are, of course, relative to the
[Page 11 ]
legal system. A general example is the prosecutor's burden of
proof in a criminal case - you are "innocent until proven guilty".
This group of meta-norms is, however, not too well defined. In
Norwegian legal theory it has, for instance, been proposed that norms
governing the burden of proof may be gererated by the special facts of
the case itself, for instance based on an assessment of the
consequences of alternative decisions, cfr Bratholm/Hov 1973:300-301.
Once again we encounter a set of meta-norms which open a feedback
channel from a later stage in the decision process.
Through the meta-norms governing the burden of proof, the lawyer
arrives at a set of facts which is proven. These may differ
from the probable facts of the case to the extent that
qualified probability is required for a certain circumstance to be
proven.
The case - as described by the proven facts - is the platform from
which the lawyer launches his search for relevant norms. (To us it is
important to stress that the model takes the facts of the case
rather than the legal norms as its point of departure, cfr
Kilian 1974:42.) The lawyer has used his legal background knowledge in
order to extract the proven facts from the totality of the problem.
And he may already have used feedback information from later elements
in our model of the decision process. But generally speaking we may
say that up to this point substantive law has not entered into the
process.
In order to arrive at a decision, the lawyer has, of course, to
select the relevant norms from the legal system. The retrieval process
is part of - but not identical with - this selection.
[Page 12 ]
2.4 Legal sources
For the purpose of this book, we understand by the term "norm" a
certain content found in certain statements (cfr Sundby 1974:17). A
norm is of a semantic nature, but is based on certain statements of a
syntactic nature.
In order to identify norms, it is therefore necessary to define
what statements qualify as a foundation when arguing that a certain
norm exists. This definition is given by meta-norms, and the
statements qualified according to these meta-norms are called "legal
sources".
The distinction between legal sources and legal norms is
fundemental. In regards to computerized systems, the distinction is
also of a very practical nature. Legal sources are typically of a
written nature (statutes, regulatory law, court decisions, etc). The
text of these sources may be processed by a computer, and the
assistance of a computerized system may be used to sort out documents
defined by certain characteristics like the occurence of certain terms
or citations or by combinations of these. But when the computer has
retrieved the defined units of text, the lawyer is left with only a
set of legal sources. The legal norms that may be founded on this set
of legal sources must still be formulated in the mind of the lawyer.
It would fall outside the scope of this book to discuss
the problems related to legal norms and their nature. On the other
hand, legal norms are fundamental to all legal thought, and a clear
understanding of their nature is necessary even in a book with our
limited scope. We have taken recent legal theory as our frame of
reference, cfr especially the detailed discussion by Sundby 1974.
In our terminology, norms are of a semantic nature. This
does not imply that we disregard the efforts made to represent legal
norms in a more
[Page 13 ]
unambiguous way than possible in natural language. Both
deontic logic and certain projects with computerized systems (deontic
systems) have indicated ways of representing norms in an unambiguous
way. Cfr for instance Bing 1977, Niblett 1980, Ciampi 1982 and Maretti
1982. This does not, however, alter the fact that the norms are still
of a semantic nature, while the representations - though less
ambiguous - are of a syntactic nature.
By our definition, a legal source is a text, a statement or an
opinion (voiced, for instance, by the local chamber of commerce on the
sales practices within a certain trade). The content of the source may
be used by the lawyer as arguments in constructing legal norms. The
lawyer must, ought to or may take the arguments of a certain source
into consideration when arguing for the existence or specific content
of a legal norm. A group of legal sources having the same origin will
be termed a type of legal sources.
Only arguments which are derived from legal sources may be
used when reasoning on the existence or content of a specific legal
norm. Consequently, the qualifications of a statement as a legal
source becomes a matter of some importance. The qualification is based
on legal meta-norms relative to the legal system in question. They are
rarely made explicit. On the other hand, they are not - at least
within the Norwegian legal system - controversial. Disagreement on a
legal point very rarely centers on whether the statement basic to an
argumet is a legal source or not. In Norwegian legal theory there has
been, however, a few instances where the status of certain types of
legal sources have been discussed - cfr for instance Fleischer
(1965:152) on the status of decisions by the first instance courts.
A similar discussion has taken place in California. In
1963 the state parliament introduced selective publishing of court
decisions under the supervision of the Californian Supreme Court, cfr
Government Code of California sect 68895. According to this section,
the Supreme Court decided that "important" decisions of the appeal
courts should be published. In 1972 the "burden of proof" was reversed
in such a way that instead of
[Page 14 ]
not publishing cases when they were found unimportant,
cases should only be published when found important. In Rule no 975(b)
in California Rules of Court it is now stated that
"No opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate
department of the superiour Court shall be published in the Official
Reports unless such an opinion (1) establishes a new rule of law or
alters or modifies an existing rule, (2) involves a legal issue of
continuing public interest, or (3) critisizes existing law." Each of
these criteria is explained in footnotes.
The criteria will not seem unduly restrictive judged
against the background of the Norwegian legal system. But obviously
this regulation has to be assessed in the perspective of the
Anglo-American case law system, and the extensive publishing which led
to amendments in two steps, in 1963 and 1972.
The justification for the amendments were simply to
reduce the volume of case law which every year was added to the legal
system, and which made it more difficult for lawyers to cope with the
information situation, cfr Kanner 1973:388. But the result was not
satisfactory. It created a serious availability crisis, what Kanner
(1973:390) calls "two lawyer levels":
"... the uninitiated ordinary practitioner who keeps up
with the advance sheet and knows only what he reads there, and the
specialist-insider who collects unpublished opinions in his field
as well, and who therefore posesses a special insight into the
thinking of intermediate appellate courts."
In our context, the major point is that no improvement in
the information situation of the lawyer became appearant. As published
decisions had the same status as an unpublished decision, it resulted
only in the loss of an information system previously available, and an
availability crisis as mentioned above. It was also maintained that
the Superior Court exploited its control of the publishing to "get rid
of what it apparently
[Page 15 ]
deems to be erroneous or otherwise improvident
decisions".
In this situation, several remedies might be sought.
Interestingly enough, California opted for a regulation of what should
be qualified as legal sources. In an amendment taking force January
1st, 1974 the Rules of Court no 977 was given the following form:
"An opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate
department of a superior court that is not published in the Official
Reports shal not be cited by a court or by a party in any other action
or proceeding except ..." (the exceptions are fairly limited).
In this way, California gives us a rare example of an
attempt to regulate the qualification of legal sources by a written
and explicit rule. It also gives us an insight into the
interrelationship between information systems (in this case, the
Official Reports) and the legal argument itself.
Through these meta-norms, a volume of statements is defined. This
volume represents the total number of legal sources of the legal
system. The lawyer looking for norms relevant to his case, must direct
his attention towards these sources.
Obviously, the lawyer does not have access to the total number of
legal sources, but only to the part of these sources which is
available to him. Sources are made available through some sort of
communication process, and at this point in our model, we find that it
impinges upon the model we shall discuss later - the model of legal
communication processes. At this stage we shall therefore simply
presume that some sources have been made available. We note that those
circumstances which limit the access to the total volume of legal
sources are termed availability factors, and also that there is
no real disaster for the lawyer to be screended in this way: the total
number of sources would be a deluge of trivial decisions and outdated
regulations which in general he is grateful not to have to wade
through in his search for relevant legal sources. Nevertheless, he
will be concerned if the availability factors in a systematic
[Page 16 ]
way make a smaller set of sources available to him than to his
collegues working in the same legal field. Such a discrimination will
be termed "availability discrimination", and will be considered in
more detail later.
At this stage we collapse the communication process to a screen
between the total volume of legal sources and those available to the
lawyer. Noting this, we go on to consider what he will be doing with
the available legal sources. It is towards these he will turn
in his quest for the appropriate legal norms, and to identify the
legal sources on which these may be based, he has to conduct a
retrieval process.
[Page 17 ]
2.5 The retrieval process
At this point, the lawyer has described his case through a set of
proved facts. His task is to find the legal sources from which he may
derive arguments to construct relevant legal norms. Only rarely is the
background knowledge of the lawyer sufficient for him to decide the
case outright. And in our model, we will presume that it is necessary
to supplement the background knowledge with a more specific knowledge
of applicable legal norms.
On one hand the lawyer has the problem described as a set of facts
or circumstances. On the other hand the lawyer has a volume of texts.
His task is to bridge the gap between the problem and the legal
sources in order to arrive at the applicable legal norms. This is the
retrieval process.
In order to give a general discription of how this gap is bridged,
one may briefly take a look at the legal norms for which the lawyer is
searching.
A legal norm is usually described as consisting of two elements,
the antecedent setting out the conditions for its application, and the
consequent, setting out the consequences of its application. The two
segments are combined in a way which is usually described by verbs
like "must", "can", "may" etc.
This simple model of a legal norm is sufficient to point out that
the antecedent sets out the conditions for the application of a
certain norm, and these conditions are descriptions of situations in
terms of circumstances and facts. We note that there is a
correspondence between the antecedent and the facts of the case at
hand: If the norm in question may be applied to the case at hand, the
facts of this case must fit the description of the antecedent.
We have already established that legal norms may be constructed out
of arguments derived only from legal sources. The antecedent, as part
of the legal norm, must be constructed in the same way. Consequently,
[Page 18 ]
the text of the legal sources must contain descriptions of the
situations defined by the antecedents.
In this way, it is possible to point out that the bridge between
the case at hand and the legal sources is in principle represented by
the facts of the case. By using these facts, the lawyer should be able
to retrieve the relevant legal sources.
This presumes that the lawyer has access to an information system.
Obviously, the lawyer cannot let the search for relevant legal sources
be dependent on chance only, for instance by opening books at random.
Neither can the lawyer permit himself to read all the available legal
sources sequentially. He has to use tools which allow him to take
short-cuts, retrieving legal sources with a high probability of being
relevant. The information system is just such a short-cut.
Retrieval systems may be designed in a number of different ways. At
this stage we shall not dwell on the different alternatives, but
rather point out that they have at least one feature in common: they
allow the user to formulate search requests.
The search request has to be consistent with certain rules imbedded
in the information system. Any information system impose restrictions
on the search request.
A traditional back-of-the-book index restricts the user to those
terms listed in the index: the search request has to be one of these
terms, and will then give a reference to the pages characterized by
that term.
A computerized text-retrieval system will allow the user to include
any word from the natural language texts of the documents, including
codes and terms in abstracts or indexes added to the authentic text by
an editor.
Though the rules for formulating search requests - the search
language - may vary widely from one system to another, the basic
fact remains: within the restrictions imposed by the system the user
may formulate his request.
[Page 19 ]
We stress this point just to clarify that all retrieval
systems imply the formulation of search requests, regardless of
whether the system is computerized or manual. The available legal
sources are of a syntactic nature. In order to employ a retrieval
system, a bridge has to be constructed reaching from the semantic to
the syntactic level. The search request - which represents the problem
or part of it in a way permitted by the information system - is this
bridge.
In a computerized system the search request plays an essential
part. Such systems usually offer more possibilities in formulating
requests than conventional manual systems. The attention is shifted
towards the requests. Retrieval strategies - the way of formulating
adequate requests - becomes more important, reflecting the
possibilities of choice.
As pointed out, we do not find differences in principle
between the use of a computerized system and, for instance, a
conventional library system. Both requires that questions are
transformed into search requests. The flexibility of the search
language will vary from one system to another, but this is only a
difference in degree. The principal difference would be between
systems where a syntactic search is necessary, and systems which would
"understand" the question in much the same way as a human, for
instance a collegue, would understand the lawyer when describing his
problem. So far systems allowing this are as not developed. Even those
experimental systems employing techniques from the field of artificial
intelligence and computational linguistics pivots on conventional
search strategies. In our view, the critical comments of Slayton
(1974:22) on the difference between retrieval in a "normal library
situation" and retrieval by computerized systems are based on the
misconception that the "normal library situation" includes information
systems permitting what Slayton somewhat vaguely calls "random
conceptual searching".
As an illustration of the restrictions imposed on the user in
formulating his request by a conventional retrieval system, we may
take the precedent files in a public agency. Research has demonstrated
that such
[Page 20 ]
files are generally organized corresponding to sections in the
statute governing the activities of the agency. In such a situation
the lawyer cannot use the facts of the case at hand when formulating
his search request - he must formulate the request as a section of a
statute. If he is mistaken in his choice of sections, he will not be
able to find an identical case in the precedent file (cfr Bing 1982b).
This may also serve as an occasion to look somewhat more critically
at the model. According to the model, the lawyer considers the facts
of his case and uses these for constructing a search request. The
search request functions as some sort of definition, qualifying which
circumstances should be described in a legal source for it to be
"retrieved".
The lawyer may object that this is a rather unrealistic description
of the retrieval situation. Often the retrieval process is intuitive -
the memory of the lawyer prompts him with the possible relevant
references to the literature and case law. Often the lawyer will also
easily identify which sections of a statute or which general
systematic term cases or other sources will be indexed by to be
considered relevant for the case at hand. These are examples of the
background information which makes alternative search strategies
possible and adequate. Though the facts of the case represent the only
bridge from the problem to the law, the lawyer in practice will
interpose his knowledge and experience, and be able to do quite a lot
of the work inside his own head, which in our model is presumed to be
carried out explicitly by a retrieval system.
The result of processing the initial search request is a
preliminary retrieval of a set of legal sources. These sources are
written documents in the form of statutes, regulations, court
decisions, etc. By interpreting these sources, the lawyer may
construct the legal norms. The interpretation may be a trivial process
indeed, and include only the reading of a text. But in our
terminology, any understanding of a legal source (through
reading or listening) presumes an interpretation, a "decoding" in the
psychological sense. A further discussion on interpretation will be
persued below at sect 2.6.
During the preliminary interpretation if the legal
[Page 21 ]
source, the lawyer considers the description of facts or
circumstances found in the sources, comparing them to the facts of his
case. Where a correspondence is found, the legal source in question is
put aside as relevant.
The examination of the legal sources will take place regardless of
the information system employed by the lawyer. In an interactive
computerized system, this phase will correspond to the browsing at the
terminal. The text of the retrieved sources may be displayed, and the
lawyer may rapidly browse through them in search for possible relevant
documents. Special features of the system - for instance highlighting
or focusing - facilitates browsing. In this phase, the computer
functions as a "reading glass". The increased efficiency of the
browsing by computerized compared to manual systems, should be highly
appreciated.
In going through a set of legal sources, the lawyer will gain
insight into the legal problems related to his case. The browsing
stage is also a learning stage. User research has indicated that the
lawyer may spend quite some time at the terminal, and the explanation
given is the time being spent mapping the general legal background on
which the case at hand is to be judged.
One may observe that since the facts of the case define which legal
sources are relevant, the legal norms (and, indirectly, the legal
sources) define which facts are relevant. The lawyer, when deciding
that one fact among his set of proven facts is relevant, bases this
decision on the hypothesis that there exists at least one norm
including this fact. But norms may be formulated only on the basis of
legal sources, and to find these the lawyer- in principle - needs to
construct search requests on the basis of legally relevant facts. At
this stage the lawyer does not know whether the selected facts are
really relevant. He relies on his background knowledge. This is
necessary both in order to select facts for constructing the search
requests, and for formulating the requests, ie selecting the terms
that are most likely to represent the facts in the available sources
(or in an index to such sources). A lack of background knowledge will
only accidentially be remedied by an effective information retrieval
system. Therefore a computerized system will also serve the
knowledgable
[Page 22 ]
lawyer better than the ignorant one. And laymen, lacking legal
insight, will be more or less helpless when confronted with such a
system. An information system designed to give legal information to
non-lawyers should be designed on other principles, including, for
instance, a sub-system capable of problem analysis, a process which
in our model is presumed to be manual.
One may note that the analysis prior to the formulation
of a search requests indicates one of the major problems of
computerized text retrieval as experienced by the user - the problem
of specificity. When formulating the request, the lawyer uses
the proven facts of the case. But in the legal sources, the facts may
be represented by words different from those one would be inclined to
select when describing the case a hand. If the case concerns a bull
inflicting damage on a hiker, a legal source of a general nature
(like, for instance, a statute) would most probably not use the word
"bull", but rather a more general phrase like "domestic animal". In a
legal source of a casuistic nature (for instance case law), the fact
may be represented by the word "bull", but equally well by synonyms
like "ox" or "steer", or by terms denoting other domestic animals like
"horse" or "goat" - or even the names of specific animals, like
"Ferdinand" for the guilty bull. This illustrates the importance of
background knowledge not only of the relevant field of law, but also
of the legal language. Later we shall discuss strategies of
system design which may help to overcome this problem.
The feedback given through browsing in the preliminary retrieved
sources may alter the lawyer's understanding of this problem. He may
want to rephrase his search request in order to reflect this change.
(It may even become necessary to go back to earlier stages of the
decision process - this is one of the dynamic aspects understated by
our model.) The new search request may retrieve additional sources,
which once again may deepen the lawyer's understanding and lead to a
rephrasing of the search request.
This iterative nature of the retrieval process ought to be
reflected by the design of computerized systems, offering the
possibility of modifying earlier
[Page 23 ]
search requests and using a former request as part of a new
request.
Also, another source for further search requests may be identified.
In retrieving a preliminary set of legal sources, the lawyer may be
confronted with the usual problems of interpretation. A certain term
is used, and the lawyer is not quite sure of its meaning. A new search
request is formulated in order to find other sources discussing the
meaning of this term. Or a citation to a case is found in a case of
possible relevance - and the lawyer uses this citation as a base for a
new search request, retrieving the cited case.
In at least these two ways the retrieval process is iterative. The
retrieved sources may deepen and amend the understanding of the legal
problem, and their interpretation may spark off new problems of their
own.
Whether this iterative nature of the retrieval process is revealed
by a practical example, will depend upon a number of pragmatic
factors. For instance, a simple legal problem may have such an obvious
solution that the lawyer simply retrieves the decisive legal source
(for instance a section of the statute) and does not bother to map the
borderlines of the norms applied. This is often the case in public
administration, where a great number of trivial legal problems are
decided as a matter of routine. Also, the situation in which the
lawyer finds himself is of great importance: again, public
administration offers an illustration of a situation where the user is
often faced with a time pressure which makes him settle for a
sufficient rather than a satisfactory justification for
his decision.
In principle, the merry-go-round of the iterative retrieval process
is halted by one of two causes. The ideal cause would be that the
lawyer is satisfied that he has nothing more of substance to gain from
retrieving further legal sources. The retrieved set contains arguments
for constructing a set of norms applicable to the problem at hand. The
less ideal (but, perhaps, more common) cause is simply that the lawyer
cannot afford to use more resources on research: the trial lawyer has
run out of time, the cost of further research exceeds what the client
is
[Page 24 ]
willing to pay, etc. In both cases, the lawyer then moves on to
further stages of the decision process.
In these observations are buried some important problems. Are there
standards for legal research? Is the lawyer free to determine what is
sufficient, or are there obligations upon the lawyer to conduct a
search which is "appropriate" according to some enforceable standards?
[Page 25 ]
2.6 Interpretation: Relations between sources and norms
2.6.1 Relevancy of sources - weight of arguments
The goal of the retrieval process is to identify "relevant"
sources. A source is "relevant" when it is possible to derive from
that source at least one argument which can be used in constructing a
legal norm applicable to the case at hand. This gives a rather general
idea of what "relevant" may mean - and perhaps generally does mean -
when used to qualify a legal source.
We need, however, to be quite specific at this point. In our
terminology, we distinguish clearly between the sources on one hand,
and the information contained in these sources on the other hand. The
need for this distinction is emphasized by computer technology, while
computer systems may easily keep track of words and phrases in a
document, the system cannot today "understand" the text as this term
is commonly used. In a way the distinction between sources and norms
therefore becomes a distinction between what we currently can and
cannot do.
Lawyers are not confronted with this limitation. Therefore the
distinction has less importance when applied to their work. A lawyer
may find it straightforward to describe his reasoning by maintaining
that "section so and so of the statute applies to the case", while it
would be more exact in our terminology to say "arguments may be
derived from section so and so, of which a norm, applicable to this
case, may be constructed". There is no real difference between these
two statements, but our subject makes us sensitive to the distinctions
simplified by our terminology.
Thus a clear distinction is maintained between sources and norms.
To combine these two different elements, we have constructed an
auxiliary semantic element called "argument". The justification for
introducing this link between the sources and the norms,
[Page 26 ]
is that we think it clarifies some aspects of the interpretation
of legal norms.
Firstly, it becomes more easily understood that one source may
yield more than one argument. A court decision may, for instance,
contain a number of arguments useful for constructing the norms
applicable to the case at hand.
Secondly, it makes it easier to point out that one source may yield
arguments for more than one norm.
Thirdly, it makes it easier to introduce the concept of "weight",
which is closely related to our concept of relevance.
In this way we have created a model for which the legal sources are
imput. The lawyer interprets these sources, and derives arguments from
them. These arguments are fitted together into one or more legal norms
applicable to the case at hand.
Initially, we stated that a legal source was "relevant" if an
argument could be derived from the source which was used to construct
an applicable legal norm - which, however, will hardly lead to a
completely satisfactory understanding of the context of this book.
This is simply due to the fact that the performance of information
retrieval systems is generally measured by their ability to retrieve
"relevant" sources.
Rather often the lawyer will find a source over which he will
ponder, at least deciding that it addresses another point than that of
interest in the case at hand, and consequently no argument is derived
from this source. Such a decision is by no means trivial. But as no
argument is derived, the source will be deemed "non-relevant" by the
definition suggested above. The retrieval of this source is then held
against the system as a performance failure.
Obviously this would not be appropriate. If the interpretation of
the source in respect to the case at hand were a matter of legal
argument, the lawyer would probably be grateful to have had the
opportunity to make this assessment himself. He would have felt
uncomfortable if these elusive decisions were made by the retrieval
system. It would seem easy to
[Page 27 ]
argue that the concept of "relevance", with respect to retrieval
system when measuring their performance, should be slightly more
generous than what was indicated initially.
For this purpose - and stressing that the validity of our argument
is limited to the context of retrieval systems - we shall suggest a
different and slightly more elaborate definition of relevance:
A legal source is relevant if:
- (1) The argument of the user would have been different if the user
did not have any knowledge of the source, ie at least one argument
must be derived from the source; or
- (2) legal meta-norms require that the user considers whether the
source belongs to category (1); or
- (3) the user himself deems it appropriate to consider whether the
source belongs to category (1).
The focal point of the definition - category (1) - is the same as
the concept of relevance introduced initially. One will note that the
actual contribution of the source to the argument may be slight - it
is sufficient that an argument, perhaps of neglible weight (cfr
below), is derived. But from this point of departure, two additional
categories have been included. Firstly, those instances in which legal
meta-norms demand that the possible relevancy of certain sources
should be considered. An example may be that the authority clause of a
statute should be examined if the case rests upon a regulation based
on this statute. Secondly, those instances in which the user himself
finds it appropriate to consider a legal source. Admittedly, this
would make the relevance concept somewhat subjective. On the other
hand, it would be less than satisfactory if one maintains that a
retrieval system is malfunctioning when finding sources which the user
inspects with interest before discarding them.
In a review of Bing/Harvold 1977, Tapper (1977:11)
queries the category (1) of this definition:
[Page 28 ]
"It seems to be premised that some source material is
available, since otherwise no provisional decision could be made. If
so, it appears from the definition that further material to the same
effect must be irrelevant, because, being to the same effect, it would
not alter the decision."
The criticism addressed a prior formulation of category
(1), where the amendment of a result was made a criterion, rather than
the contribution to a legal argument. The rephrasing of the definition
should meet this objection.
One should also note that the definition is used for only
the relevance of legal sources. Obviously the lawyer will bring
knowledge from other sources into the overall solution of a problem,
not least his general background of legal knowledge.
Thus, we have given a definition of relevance. The definition is
mainly concerned with content relevance (categories (1) and (2)), but
has an element of subjective relevance (category (3)).
It should be noted as well that the relevance concept is binary - a
source is either relevant or not. This is in contrast to many general
uses of the concept of relevance - one is prone to say that a source
is more or less relevant, measuring relevance in degrees.
Once more the explanation of our definition is the use which we are
making of the concept. We are characterizing legal sources, which are
texts and that only. In order to measure relevance by degrees, a
rather thorough interpretation has to take place. In order to keep the
concept as simple and generous as possible, and thus to facilitate its
operative use in respect to computerized systems, we keep the
relevance concept binary.
By finding a source relevant, one has said just something rather
trivial of that source: from the source are derived arguments which
are either used to construct the applicable legal norms, or which were
considered appropriate in such use.
For a discussion of legal reasoning, this may not be
[Page 29 ]
sufficient. In such cases the need will arise to characterize
further the relation between a source and the applicable legal norms.
We suggest that this, in our model, is accomodated by the
arguments. The arguments are, as stated above, semantic entities
linking the sources and the norms. Arguments are associated with a
weight. This weight is determined by a number of factors, for
instance the rank of the legal source, the age and the similarity of a
prior court decision, the reputation of an author etc. A number of
factors will determine the weight of an argument, and the relative
weight will indicate the influence which this argument will have in
constructing the legal norm.
It may be maintained that to say "from a relevant legal source was
derived an argument with neglible weight" is a roundabout way of
saying "the source had negible relevance". We think, however, that
this is justified by the use made of the concepts in this book.
Experiments have demonstrated that lawyers often disagree on the
"relevance" of a certain source of law; an infamous example being the
Joint American Bar Foundation and IBM project mentioned below in part
II. This lack of consistency is not restricted to lawyers (cfr
Saracevic 1968:116-129).
Our definition will not remove such uncertainty: the definition
includes an element of subjectivity. Nevertheless, the distinction
between relevance and weight may reduce disagreement. Even though
disagreeing on the more difficult question on which relative weight
derived arguments may have, a consensus may be found on whether the
source itself should be considered relevant or not.
2.6.2 Words and uncertainty
In this context, we have no intention of giving a summary of the
doctrine of legal interpretation. The process of interpretation is
governed by legal metanorms, and is the subject of an extensive
literature as well as of any lawyer's training. No general
[Page 30 ]
discussion will therefore be offered beyond the one implied by
the model introduced above.
We shall, however, offer some observations on the interpretation of
words and phrases occurring in natural language texts - mainly because
text retrieval systems, which is our main concern in this book,
operates by retrieving text through identifying the words contained in
them. Some comments on the interpretation of words as such may
therefore be useful in respect to later discussions.
Words occurring in natural language texts are necessarily vague,
and often ambiguous. This is also true when the natural language text
is as carefully drafted as the text of a statute.
One reason is the way in which the interpretation of terms are
molded by their context. Our language does not consist, as a rule, of
well-defined elements. The words are rather like nodes in a
semantic-associative network. The interpretation of the words are
influenced by the total context as well as by the background knowledge
of the interpreter. A well-known example illustrating this aspect of
language is the different meanings implied by the word "man" when
combined with another word (cfr Rommetveit 1972:64):
"man" - "animal"
"man" - "woman"
"man" - "boy"
"man" - "son"
Another reason is that the words are vague, a classical observation
is contained in rethorical questions like "When does a copse become a
forest?" and "When does a shack become a house?". Another example is
the term "book", which - for instance - may occur in a VAT statute,
stating that "books" are excepted from VAT (as actually is the case in
Norway). It then becomes necessary to distinguish between "books" and
a publication not being a "book". In many cases this is a trivial
distinction, offering no problems to the lawyer. But in certain cases
there is doubt - when does a collection of loose leaves in a ring
binder become a "book", when does a voluminous magazine become a
"book" etc.
To resolve such vagueness, the lawyer has initially
[Page 31 ]
to look for the general use of the term "book" in society. The
vagueness is to be resolved outside the legal system, as part of the
language rather than of the law.
In this way, it is easy to demonstrate that the problem of
interpretation of legal sources may not be separated from the more
general problem of natural language itself. This also characterize
text retrieval systems used for legal purposes: some of the problems
encountered are not caused by the legal nature of the documents in the
data base, but by the properties of natural language. But this is also
an insufficient explanation of the problems of interpretation, as will
be obvious to any lawyer. It is not sufficient to look for the normal
use of a word for resloving its legal interpretation.
One technique commonly used in statutory language is to introduce
definitions of a word. Such legal definitions obviously will take
precedence over the common use of the word, and perhaps create a
divergence of the interpretation of the word as part of a legal and
non-legal context. For the word "book" it would, for instance, be
reasonable to adopt the UNESCO definition of a "book" as a non-
periodical publication of at least 48 pages. This may exclude some
publications commonly described as books (for instance certain
children's books), but would, if introduced in our fictitious VAT
statute, remove the vagueness and take precedence over interpretations
implied by the common use of the word.
Explicit definitions play an important role in statutory language.
As the defined terms do not by themselves signal that they are used in
a defined meaning, it becomes important to the lawyer to identify
possible definitions relevant to the statutory clauses under
interpretation. Actually algorithms for the identification of
definitions have been devised, and they seem to work well with respect
to English statutory language.
The explicit definitions are, however, only one of several ways in
which the terms used in describing legal norms in the sources are made
less vague. A common situation would be that a case is brought before
the court, in which the judge has to take a stand on the
interpretation of a certain vague term -
[Page 32 ]
for instance "book". In making his decision, the judge creates a
new legal source which is then injected into the legal system. The law
changes in a minute detail - no longer may the interpretation of the
word "book" be based solely on the common use, thus the case has added
a specific interpretation to the term. As time goes by, these
additional legal sources may well give the term "book" a specific
interpretation which removes the legal meaning from the every-day use
of the term.
Such additional material, which may determine the interpretation of
a word in a statute, is not signaled by that word itself. Again, the
lawyer must be aware of this possibility, and make the necessary
research to establish if such a legal meaning of the terms has
developed. It is also obvious that text retrieval systems are
extremely well suited to cope with this type of legal research, giving
fast access to all sources in the data bases using the word or phrase
in question.
A vagueness of a different order may, however, also be associated
with the words of legal language. And certain words in the legal
language are indicators of discretionary decisions which have
to be made.
Good examples may be difficult to give in general, and dissociated
from a specific, national system. But we may be served by the word
culpable, found, for instance, in a statutory clause on torts.
This word is then a reference to a set of legal sub-norms, which will
decide if a person's actions is to be qualified as "culpable". This
set of sub-norms is not specified explicitly in the statute, and -
indeed - not specified by any (primary) legal source. There is,
however, such a set of sub-norms, and from prior cases, text books
etc, the lawyer will gain information which will allow him to
construct the set and make his discretionary decision.
Obviously this is something different both from the task of
resolving the natural vagueness of a term, and finding the sources
giving legal definitions or describing prior interpretations of a
term. The vagueness here is not associated with language, but with
law.
Again, the word "culpable" by itself does not signal
[Page 33 ]
that it is, in fact, a discretionary flag. This the lawyer has to
clairfy for himself. Again, he may be served by a text retrieval
system. But the help given by the system this time is of a more
indirect nature - the lawyer may find sources discussing the
discretionary decision implied by the term, but the decision itself
will have to be made over again in each case, employing the sub-norms
that the lawyer considers appropriate.
The discussion of discretionary norms is obviously very
sketchy. More detailed discussions may be found in for instance Bing
1980.
2.6.3 Harmonization
Through the interpretation, arguments are selected from the legal
source in order to arrive at the legal norm relevant to the case.
During this process, the lawyer may discover that two or more legal
sources contain arguments for diverging or even conflicting legal
norms. There are, for instance, two cases that seem to disagree on the
interpretation of a statutory clause. The legal sources (the statutory
clause combined with one of the two cases) may serve as the basis of
two diverging norms. In such instances, the lawyer may look to the
weights of the arguments associated with each source, and resolve the
divergence when constructing the applicable legal norms.
But from time to time it is not possible or desirable to integrate
the resolving of the divergence in the process of interpretation. The
lawyer is forced to conclude that two norms, equally applicable but in
conflict, is the result of the interpretation. In such a case,
harmonization of the legal norms themselves is necessary.
A curious example may be found in the quite complex
Norwegian legislation govering the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages. The sect 14 and 21 of the Spirits Act of April 5th, 1927,
state that alcoholic beverages are not to be sold to persons under the
age of 18. An older statute of May 31st, 1900 No 5 sect 23, states,
however, that an exception may be made when the beverage
[Page 34 ]
is served as a refreshment to a meal or when travelling.
It is difficult to avoid a conflict between legal norms based on these
sections. The conflict is resolved by using the principle of lex
posterior degorat priori, ie the norm derived from the most recent
of the statutes is given priority, cfr letter of the Ministry of
Justice July 26th, 1974 (1975/74 E TS/AV).
There exist meta-norms governing this sort of harmonization. Some
of them are commonly known as maxims, as for instance the lex
posterior-principle mentioned above, and the other classical
principles lex specialis and lex superior. But even
these are guite vague, and the meta-norms governing harmonization has
not as a whole been very well analyzed - at least not in Norwegian
theory.
Most of the harmonization is based on a ranking of types of legal
sources. A legal norm derived from a source of higher rank is given
priority in a case of conflict. Hierarchies of types of legal sources
usually place the Constitution on the top, proceeding through statutes
enacted by the parliament down to case law and regulatory law. The
details of the ranking will certainly be relative to the legal system,
and even in regard to one legal system, the ranking may be relative to
different user groups (for example may judges be opposed to civil
servants in respect to ministerial regulations).
Several times we have used the phrase "conflict of norms"
without defining this concept. What is actually a conflict of norms,
depends to a great extent on the nature of norms. For our purposes, it
is sufficient to use the phrase "conflict of norms" as a
characteristic; a discussion may be found in Eckhoff 1971:270-305 and
Sundby 1974:278-281.
In the process of harmonization (and also in assigning weights to
arguments), the relative rank of different types of legal sources is
essential. Actually the relative rank is quite a controversial matter,
though the relations between the Constitution, statutes and regulatory
law is well established. Trying to relate the decisions of a first
instance court and legal literature would, however, be something quite
different. Our prior discussion of arguments as links
[Page 35 ]
between sources and norms will also show that it may be rather
difficult to determine from which legal source a norm is actually
derived, when the norm is constructed from arguments derived from a
variety of sources. In many ways, one may demonstrate that the
problems of harmonization is - perhaps justified - simplified by
traditional theory, based on examples rather than on a general theory.
One should make quite clear that the "rank" of a type of legal
sources is a normative question. Even if a type of sources have a high
rank, it may be of little practical use. The Constitution offers an
obvious example: though one would agree that the Constitution is given
the supreme rank, one rarely finds the solution to the legal problems
of a general practitioner in this source.
There may, however, be some interrelationship between the normative
rank and the practical utility or importance of a certain source. To
be of practical importance, the source obviously has to be available.
A good information system is therefore a prerequisite for making a
source important. And on the lower rungs of the hierarchy, one may
expect the rank to be influenced by the practical importance of a
source. An improvement of the information system serving a type of
sources will have an impact on its utility. One should also be aware
of the impact which it may have on the normative aspect, for instance
on the relative ranking of sources.
[Page 36 ]
2.7 The normative interval
We have discussed some aspects of the process of interpreting legal
sources, the harmonization of these sources as part of the
interpretation, and the harmonization of possible divergencies in the
norms arrived at through the interpretation. The aspects discussed are
mainly those of interest in relation to legal information systems. But
even within these restraints, the outlines of the process should, we
think, have emerged.
The process leaves the lawyer with a set of legal norms which are
not in internal conflict. These norms are applicable to the case at
hand - and possibly the solution of the legal problem may emerge as
the simple combination of the norms and the facts of the case. This
probably would be an adequate way of considering simple legal
problems.
In general, however, we feel that this would be a too simple
description. The final legal norms are defined by the sources found
relevant, interpreted and harmonized according to the legal meta-
norms. As we have stressed a number of times, these meta-norms are
vague. Also, the legal norms themselves may leave room for uncertainty
- norms requiring "discretion" may often permit different solutions.
It is generally accepted that the result may not be well-defined, but
rather be regarded as a normative interval - or, as Stone puts
it (1968:192 and 320): there still exsists choice within the "leeways
left by the guides of law".
Some main causes for such "leeway" may be listed. (1)
Reasonable disagreement on what sources may be qualifed as
legal sources. (2) Reasonable disagreement on the
interpretation of legal sources, causing reasonable disagreement on
which norms are applicable. (3) Reasonable disagreement on the
priority between diverging norms. (4) Reasonable disagreement in
discretionary decisions.
[Page 37 ]
Instances of such "reasonable disagreement" may explain
why two or more reputable lawyers may arrive at different decisions
even though agreeing on the proven facts of the case. For more on
causes for uncertainty, cfr Bing 1982c.
The lawyer, confronted with a normative interval, cannot arrive at
a decision without selecting one of the possible norms within the
interval. This selection is, obviously, not a random process, but is
of an extra-legal character. An important aspect of the legal
decision process is, in our opinion, that it incorporates the use of
extra-legal elements. This aspect is usually trivial, as the leeways
leave us with quite a narrow interval and a small room for choice. But
in controversial questions where there is little support for the
arguments in legal sources and, consequently, the normative interval
is sufficiently broad to contain distinct alternatives, this aspect
may attract the attention of the public.
It would be outside the scope of this book to dwell on the nature
of the selection process. Our important point is that even when all
relevant legal sources have been consulted, and their interpretation
has been made, it may still be necessary to exercise further judgement
before arriving at a decision. As we have pointed out, this selection
process is extra-legal - which implies that the lawyer may take into
consideration elements of a non-legal nature, like elements of a
political, moral or ethical character.
Though these elements are extra-legal, it should be clearly
understood that their use is part of the legal decision
process, and is governed by legal meta-norms as the rest of this
process. Even within the leeways of law, there are limits to what
extralegal aspects may be taken into consideration. Reviewing a
decision of a public agency, a court may, for instance, find that the
decision is void exactly for this reason. But once again, we must
admit that these meta-norms are vague and not well analysed. (For a
different view than the one sketched here, cfr Kilian 1974:228.)
One extra-legal element often decisive at this stage, is client
loyality. Obviously, the candidate to be selected will be the norm
within the interval most
[Page 38 ]
benificiary to the client. This obviously will be permitted also
by the meta-norms; lawyers are after all expected to argue the case of
their clients.
In our context, it may also be of interest to note that for the
selection of a norm within the interval, the legal information
retrieval system can give little aid to the lawyer. This is part of
the decision process which presumes an understanding of the individual
case, an understanding one can hardly expect to retrieve from a data
base of legal sources.
[Page 39 ]
2.8 The result - and feedback from the result
The lawyer has now arrived at the relevant norms, which, combined
with the facts of the case at hand, give the result.
Up till now our model has not allowed for the effect of the
result playing any part in the reasoning of the lawyer (excluding the
indirect way in which this may have determined the burden of proof,
choice within the normative interval, etc). The effect of the result -
or the sensibility of the decision - is, however, a legal source in
its own right, but of a very different nature from those included in
the data base. In our model, this legal source is represented as a
feedback loop. The lawyer evaluates the result according to his
extra-legal value norms. His evaluation is then taken into
consideration as a legal source, and as such will influence the
normative interval. This feedback may cause a revision of the result.
An iterative process is initiated, which comes to a stop only when the
feedback can no longer influence the normative interval.
As an example of the reasoning in which this feedback
plays a part, we may cite a Norwegian superior court case (Rt
1965:607). At the time of the decision, paternity was decided with
different burdens of proof according to whether the child was born in
or out of wedlock. The case concerned a girl who, on discovering that
she was pregnant, told a boy she had been with, that he was the
father. The boy married the girl, but both kept living with their
parents. The child was born in wedlock, as the martial status of the
parents at the moment of birth is decisive. After the birth, it became
apparent that there existed a number of possible fathers, and the
probability of the husband actually being the father was not higher
than the probability of one of the other candidates. According to the
burden of proof in wedlock, he nevertheless was the father. Had the
case been decided in respect to a child born out of wedlock, he would
not have been held the
[Page 40 ]
father. One judge of the minority felt that this result
was so "unjust" in the concrete context of the case, that he
maintained that this by itself could justify an exception, in spite of
the clearly formulated statutory rule. Without taking a stand on the
justice of the issue, this would seem a quite explicit example of
feedback from the result widening the normative interval to include
new alternative norms - according to the argument of the minority.
It may be noted that "the evaluation of the result" is a legal
source of a qualitatively different nature compared to the other types
of legal sources. Several times we have stressed that the majority of
other legal sources is of a syntactic nature, having the form of
texts. The "evaluation of the result" is a semantic argument based on
the judgement of the lawyer.
Another characteristic of the "evaluation of the result" may be
noted: the evaluation can only be carried out in respect of a given
case with a given result. It does not exist independently of the case,
but is gererated by the case itself. Consequently, it cannot be
"retrieved" from any data base established prior to the case.
We believe the feedback loop represented by the "evaluation of the
result" to be of great interest, also with respect to legal
information systems. It is one of the best illustrations of the
iterative nature of legal decision processes - a characteristic which
most automated decision processes have not yet been able to represent,
or have ignored.
It may be appropriate to stress once more that our model
is just a model of the elements in a legal decision process,
describing the relation between these elements - but not the
psychological process itself. Certainly a lawyer may have selected his
result at a far earlier stage of the process than represented in our
model. He will select what Soelberg (1967:23 and 26) has named a
"choice candidate", and in practice the lawyer's activities may be
wholly concerned with justifying that a decision based on his choice
candidate does not violate the meta-norms governing the legal decision
process. Cfr also Eckhoff
[Page 41 ]
1971:29 who discusses what comes first in the mind of a
judge: the result or the reasoning to justify the result.
The legal decision process is a formal process; it is
governed by meta-norms to a greater extent than decision processes
within other areas. The meta-norms are admittedly vague and leave room
for disagreement even between lawyers, but nevertheless they are
valid. If a lawyer violates these meta-norms - or, rather, if such a
violation is found to have taken place - his decision may be declared
void. The metanorms mostly demand that a case be decided on what
has happened, and according to legal norms that were in
existence at that time. It is a retrospective process in which
the lawyer concentrates most of the time on a situation from the past.
The evaluation of the result is an escape from this
retrospective perspective. Legal meta-norms allow the lawyer at this
stage of the process to look at the present and even into the future,
asking, "What will be the effect of my decision?"
The evaluation of the result represents a safety valve in the legal
decision process. Through this the lawyer may make his decision
oriented more towards the consequences.
An illustration of this was noted in one of the surveys of the
legal information systems of the Social Security Administration
(Bing/Harvold 1973:228). The Social Security Administration is mostly
staffed with civil servants without a formal legal education. They
have more often been trained in medical or welfare environments, and
are used to thinking in terms of the future of the clients. A medical
decision, for instance, is oriented towards its consequences: if the
patients get better, the ordained cure was "correct" - even when
selected by intuition and in disagreement with the opinion of
authorities. Not so in a legal decision process: Even if the decision
makes the client happy, it is invalid if in conflict with a statute.
The link between the "medical" and the "legal" decision processes
is the "evaluation of the result". We found that this legal source was
given higher rank in the Social Security Administration relative to
[Page 42 ]
arguments derived from sources like regulatory law. And as the
rank of the "evaluation of the result" was upgraded, the gap between
the "medical" and "legal" reasoning was reduced.
These reservations may be of some importance to legal information
systems. Better legal information systems may - as we have
mentioned earlier - result in a displacement of the established
relative ranks of the legal sources. If a better legal retrieval
system were established in the Social Security Administration, this
might result in increasing the rank of conventional types of legal
sources, like administrative decisions. It would correspond to a
reduced relative weight given to arguments derived from the
type "evaluation of the result". Since this seems at present to serve
as some sort of bridge between two different types of decision
processes, ie the "medical" and the "legal", the reduced weight might
break that bridge. The possible consequences of introducing a "better"
legal information system with its resulting dynamics, should not be
underestimated.
[Page 43 ]
2.9 Standards for legal information retrieval
The legal decision process has been described above as a
formal process, indicating that to a large extent it is
governed by meta-norms. We have also discussed the retrieval process
itself, and shown that this is an iterative process brought to a halt
either by the lawyer being confident that all possible relevant
sources have been retrieved, or by exhausting the resources (in terms
of time or money) allocated for this activity.
But since the legal decision process is formal, we might expect to
find standards enforced within the legal system which would require a
minimum quality of the legal research. If this minimum of research
were not observed, we would expect the legal system to direct some
sort of sanctions against the responsible lawyer.
The traditional doctrine of error juris may be examined from
this point of view. Error juris - ignorance of the law - is a
rather traditional aspect of the legal doctrine. Error juris
may, obviously, have a number of causes - the most common probably
being unsound reasoning and careless interpretation of legal sources.
We will not discuss these causes, which are related to the dysfunction
of lawyers rather than to the malfunction the information systems.
The malfunctions of the retrieval system may - for the purpose of
this discussion - be divided into two broad categories.
Above we have tried to make the point that the information
situation of the lawyer is determined by the availability factors
screening the total volume of legal sources. These factors are of
widely different nature, and one would expect them to be different for
each individual lawyer. In this case, the set of sources available to
one lawyer will not be identical to the set of sources available at
the same costs to another. This creates some uncertainty in the legal
decision processes. Given the same set of proven
[Page 44 ]
facts and the same cost frame for legal research, two different
lawyers may very well come up with two different sets of relevant
legal sources due to their different information situation. This cause
for retrieving a different set of legal sources may be termed the
cause of availability failure.
There is, however, also another cause related to the information
system. In order to retrieve the sources, we have seen that the lawyer
has to formulate a search request accepted by the information system.
Though the request may be quite to the point, there is always the
possibility of failure in the search mechanism of the information
system. An obvious indexing term is, for instance, omitted, or a word
in a text is misspelled, making the text retrieval system unable to
identify the desired source. The differences in the retrieval tools
may therefore also cause a different set of relevant sources to be
identified. This cause for two lawyers retrieving different sets of
sources may be termed retrieval failure.
It is, of course, rather common that two lawyers disagree on a
legal issue. And obviously, if a problem is taken to court, at least
one of them will not gain the consent of the judge. If a client has
followed the advice of the lawyer, but later learns that the opinion
on which the advice was based, was incorrect - ie a different decision
is reached by a court or established in another authorative way - this
constitutes proof of error juris. The client may then bring a
suit against the lawyer, suing him for the loss which the incorrect
advice has caused.
The interesting thing about this situation, is that the court will
have to discuss the advice offered by the lawyer, and - if the
error juris is related to the information system - consider if
the lawyer is liable for the properties of the information systems he
employed, or the way he employed these systems.
These situations do not occur too frequently in practice, and the
case law is less than abundant. Below, however, two situations are
outlined. Because the discussion is limited to certain jurisdictions,
the description is somewhat sketchy.
The first situation is that of a civil servant making
[Page 45 ]
a decision pursuant to some law or regulation. This may then
cause a loss to a private citizen. Subsequently, it is demonstrated
that the civil servant has made an error juris. If the citizen
then sues the authority, it must be considered if the authority is
liable.
This situation would be interesting in our context if the cause of
the incorrect opinion is related to the information system. Norwegian
case law does not, however, contain such examples. The doctrine
maintains that a public authority is more easily made responsible for
losses caused by incorrect procedures than those caused by incorrect
interpretation or application of the law (Eckhoff 1978:603-604).
The more interesting aspect in our context is, however, the rather
strong criticism voiced in legal literature, where it is stressed that
the risks of causing losses through the exercise of public authority
should rest with the state rather than with those citizens subjected
to incorrect application of the law. This point of view is then used
to argue for strict liability for such losses, which certainly would
also embrace malfunctions etc of the information systems used by
public authorities (Frihagen 1977:150).
In our terms, this would imply that an error juris by a
public authority resulting in a citizen suffering a loss, would be
liable to this citizen if the cause of the error juris
was related to the information systems employed. This would cover both
the case of availability and retrieval failure. This may also be
viewed as an encouragement for public authorities to make the
necessary resources available to maintain their information systems
with satisfactory performance.
The second situation is that of a private practising lawyer
offering advice to a client, and this client is suffering a loss when
acting on his advice. One may consider whether the lawyer is liable.
In general this question is answered affirmatively by Scandinavian
doctrine - but it is a rather theoretical general rule. No strict
liability is considered, and the modifications argued by the
literature are many - the culpability is related to the nature of
[Page 46 ]
the advice, the fee, the way the lawyer has phrased his advice,
etc.
This relativity is illustrated by a Danish case (UfR 1945:205). In
brief, the case concerned a seller of a property containing an attic
apartment. After the conclusion of the sale, the construction of this
apartment was shown to be in conflict with current regulations. The
lawyer advised the seller to reduce the price as he should be able to
claim compensation from the person who had sold the property to him.
Subsequently, the lawyer changed his mind. And the client sued the
lawyer for the loss.
In this case the court held that it was not unreasonable for the
lawyer to answer the question of the client on the basis of his
background knowledge, without further legal research. In fact, the
court maintained that the lawyer was under no obligation to use an
information system - and this is considered to be a rather general
conclusion by Danish theory (Kruse 1976:51). In our terms, the cause
of the error juris was availability failure, no resources were
assigned to legal resarch.
A further example may be a Swedish case (NJA 1957:89). In this
case, a lawyer representing a limited company arranged for the loan
with another of his clients, staking the property of the company as
security. The clause of the security bond limited this to the property
within a certain municipality. Later, the company moved out of that
municipality. In the bankruptcy proceedings the security was found
invalid due to the cited clause. The client sued the lawyer, who
maintained that his incorrect advice was caused by a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous section in a statute of 1883.
The court admitted that this clause was indeed ambiguous, but
pointed out that this ambiguity had been solved by the superior court
in a decision of 1904. The lawyer argued further that this decision
was not cited in the foot-note to the statutory section in the
privately published compilation of statutes in force. The court
granted this, but referred to a text book of 1927, which contained the
appropriate citation, and which was considered to be rather basic to
this area of law.
[Page 47 ]
In our context, it is interesting to notice that the argument
actually tends to discuss the problems of retrieval failure. The
compilation of statutes in force did not have the necessary citation -
and did consequently malfunction as an index to major cases. The court
argued contrary to this, by referring to another book also functioning
as an index, and which the court held he ought to have consulted. The
court did not address the problem of what the outcome would have been
if this second "index" had not been available, but opened for the
possibility that in such a case, the lawyer would not have been
liable. Traditional Norwegian theory also takes this stand (Platou
1915:81).
Actually, this is rather interesting for the providers of
computerized services, offering a more efficient retrieval system. The
reasoning above may well imply that the very existence of a more
efficient retrieval system also creates some sort of obligation or
inducement to use such a system.
In addition there is another aspect that has not been illustrated
by these examples. In the Swedish case, the lawyer was found liable.
The cause would seem partly to be the omission in the privately
published compilation of statutes in force. It would have been rather
interesting if the lawyer in his turn had sued the publishers, a case
which would have illuminated the liability of the providers of a legal
information service.
Indeed, this problem is addressed by Mehl (1979) and the draft
recommendation which is the basis of the Council of Europe
Recommendation No R (83) 3 on "The protection of users of computerised
legal information services" (the chapter on liability is not included
in the final recommendation). This activity takes computerized
legal information services as its point of departure. As the
discussion in this section has demonstrated, the legal question is
closely related to the traditional doctrine of error juris. It
is discussed in the literature with a reference to traditional
information services, and probably case law more to the point may be
found than those Scandinavian examples cited here.
This problem of the liability of legal information
services is only one of several issues which
[Page 48 ]
make up "the law of legal information services". These
are discussed more comprehensivly by Moon/Oskamp 1982.
[Page 49 ]
3 COMMUNICATION PROCESSES
3.1 Introduction
A "communication process" is a system of activities which supports
the transport of information from one person (the sender) to another
person (the receiver). This process is performed by some mechanism
known as an "information system" (cfr Goffman 1970:726). Parts of this
process are not only activities and persons, but also those objects
carrying the information (for instance scraps of paper or magnetic
media) and those tools used for sorting and selecting relevant
information (like a text retrieval system). Initially, a communcation
process may be pictured as a link between the sender and the receiver,
this link being the information system itself.
In a legal communication process, the information will be of a
legal nature, the receiver will be a lawyer, while the sender will be
a combination of the producer of a legal source (the parliament, a
certain court) and an editor maintaining a certain information
service.
Obviously, the formal description of communication
processes may easily be elaborated, and definitions introduced to
eliminate the ambiguities in the description above. What, for
instance, is indicated by "legal" information - is the newspaper
stories of a sensational murder trial "legal information" in our sense
of the word? In Bing 1982a such questions have been addressed in some
detail. It is, however, our opinion that for the purpose of this book,
a quite informal and general description is sufficient. When returning
to the issues which will be discussed in more detail, we will try to
be as specific as necessary. But the communication process is in this
chapter mainly used as a common perspective on certain related issues,
and these issues, rather than the overall process, will be brought
into focus.
[Page 50 ]
The perspective of the communication process is useful, we believe,
to stress that legal information systems are actually media for
communication between two parties. In respect to computerized systems,
there is, perhaps, a tendency to concentrate too much on the power of
the tool for retrieving documents, and too little on its properties as
a distribution network. In many manual systems, this is solved less
satisfactorily. Firstly, in a manual system one will have to plan
ahead by subscribing to or purchasing an information service before
the need to use this service actually arises. Secondly, a local
maintenance of the manual data base is necessary, and also often
time-consuming - as anybody struggling to keep a loose-leaf service up
to date will confirm. Computerized systems have centralized
maintenance of the data bases, and as long as the user has access to
the service, he may also have access to any of the included
specialized data bases when the need arises.
We believe, therefore, that the perspective of the communication
process may bring into focus some characteristics of computerized
systems not easily identified when consentrating solely on the
information system proper.
In addition, we believe that the editoral work is important.
Many properties of information systems are not determined by the
programs of the computer, but rather by the decisions of the editor.
This concerns such an all-important aspect as the coverage of the data
base, and also that of document design: How is the source presented to
the user of a legal information system? In the perspective of the
communication process, the editor is clearly visible as the
representative of the sender, and his influence on the quality and
efficiency of the information system therefore may be easier to
evaluate.
In this discussion of the commpunication process, we shall
concentrate on the editoral process, and on some aspects of the
use of information systems. The information system as such will
be discussed only as a part of the communication process, since we
shall have ample opportunity later in this book to concentrate on
exactly that element (Part II).
[Page 51 ]
3.2 The editorial process: Data base selection
3.2.1 Introduction
A legal source is defined by meta-norms of the particular
jurisdiction in question. Most legal sources have a written form,
though some types, like customary law, exist only as opinions,
attitudes or behaviour in society. In our discussion, we have
restrained ourselves to those sources which have a written form.
These are obviously important types, like statutes, regulator law,
court and administrative decisions, legal literature etc. These are
also the types which are subject to dissemination by legal information
systems.
Before initiating the communication of the law, the legal source
itself must be created. This is by no means a trivial process, of
which major legislative efforts or court cases bear ample proof. But
in our context, we presume that a legal source is brought into
existence according to the rules of the jurisdiction in question.
The result is a text. It may be interesting to note that at some
stage this text must be written down. A judge may, for instance, draft
his decision, or dictate the decision to a tape recorder, and his
secretary will type it - perhaps for further correction.
The simple registration of the text is, of course, a trivial
element in the creation of legal sources. In our context, however, it
may be worth-while to notice this activity.
Firstly, the author of the source gives it the form which in this
book will be called authentic or original form. We need a
certain term for describing the original form of a statute, a court
decision etc, because the source is rarely communicated to the user in
exactly that form. The editor will, even when making the full text
available, supplement this text
[Page 52 ]
with certain editorial additions, like abstracts, indexing
terms, titles, footnotes etc, and may also make other editoral
amendments like replacing the names of the parties in a court decision
with letters, in order to protect the privacy of the involved persons.
When speaking of computerized systems, one frequently
uses the term "full text systems". Unfortunately this term is an
ambiguous one. It often indicates that the documents are in an
authentic form. But even systems which are restricted to, for
instance, documenting abstracts of court decisions, are termed "full
text systems" in order to indicate the method used to index the
abstracts - ie making all words retrievable. In these cases, the term
says only that the computerized system is a type of text retrieval
system (in contrast to, for instance, a type of data base management
system), and says nothing of the relation between the documents and
the sources. Due to this ambiguity in terminology, we do not use the
phrase "full text" in a technical sense. To describe the relation
between documents and sources, we shall use terms like "authentic
form", "abstracts" etc, and to describe the type of computerized
system we shall use "text retrieval systems" for systems allowing
retrieval in principle by any word or combination of words from the
actual documents.
Secondly, if we want to make the communication process more
effective, we may - looking forward - introduce appropriate word
processing equipment at this stage, and then exploit the same
computerized text for later stages in the communication process, like
printing the decision or updating a computerized data base.
When authorized, the legal source is introduced into the legal
system as a new statute, a new court decision, a new monograph etc.
When introduced in this way, the source becomes available for lawyers,
and arguments from the source may be employed in making future legal
decisions. The constant creation of new sources is the main reason for
the evolution of the legal system.
The constant creation of new sources feeds an
[Page 53 ]
accumulating collection of sources representing the total
volume of sources of the legal system in question. This is only a
theoretical collection, there is no legal system which
maintains a physical total collection of sources. It would even be
very difficult to identify all sources. They would include a great
number of trivial sources, for instance decisions by public agencies
in those legal systems qualifying such decisions as legal sources.
They would also include dated, but still "valid" sources. And the
actual validity of a source may be difficult to establish. Even if a
new statute replaces an old, the old statute may retain some interest
as part of the legislative history of the new.
Without dwelling further on the practical and theoretical problems
of identifying clearly the total volume of sources of legal systems,
we observe that it is possible to envision a collection of them. Not
all of these sources are communicated onwards to the user - and in
general, there is little reason to regret this. A selection of the
sources is made for the purpose of including such sources in an
information system, and thereby make the sources available to the
user.
An area of great interest is the processes governing the selection
of sources for documentation in an information system. It is perhaps a
trivial, but nevertheless a basic observation, that one cannot
retrieve from an information system a document that is not part of the
system. One of the basic properties of any legal information system is
determined at this stage: What will be included in the data base?
3.2.2 Selection
An editor has a responsibility in respect to a certain information
system. The system will rarely be of a completely general nature,
setting out to document any type of legal source. Typically, the
information system will have some degree of specialization - and this
specialization will be called the documentation area.
The documentation area qualify which types of legal
[Page 54 ]
sources are to be considered for inclusion in the information
system. Within the documentation area, a further selection very often
takes place, limiting the documented sources to those considered as
being of "importance" or of "special interest", and discarding those
regarded as trivial.
In general, the selection for publication will therefore be a two
stage process. Firstly, the editor determine whether the source lies
within the documentation area. Secondly, he determines whether it
qualify according to additional supplemental criteria.
We believe that most traditional systems have a rather
high degree of specialization; a case reporter documenting decisions
from a certain court, a compilation of statutes obviously being
limited to a certain type of legal sources, a tax law journal being
limited to a certain branch of the law. It is interesting to note that
computerized systems very often have more inclusive documentation
areas, documenting any court decision, all papers of
legal journals etc. The reason is that a number of pragmatic
restraints have been removed in these systems - like the simple
problem of sheer volume in a paper-based system. A computerized
service is, however, generally divided into "data bases" or
"libraries". These very often correspond closely to the documentation
areas covered by conventional services.
For selection, two main categories of criteria can be identified,
they may be called "systematic" and "evaluative" criteria.
There are at least three sub-groups of systematic criteria:
(1) Criteria relating to the type of legal source
to be documented, for instance only supreme court decisions,
regulations etc. Within this group, it is also convenient to include
criteria more oriented towards the producer than the type of legal
sources, for instance a case reporter for a certain appeal court,
whose decisions is strictly of the same type as other appeal courts,
(2) Criteria based on legal disciplines, for
[Page 55 ]
instance a tax law journal, or the Computer Law Case
Reporter.
(3) Criteria based on procedural characteristics of the
legal source. Obviously, such criteria will vary considerably from one
jurisdiction to another. A common example is that a court, when a case
is thought unusually difficult or important, may sit in plenum, or be
supplemented by additional judges. This will then also be a
characteristic of the source which may be utilized when selecting
cases for publication. In this category we may also include the use of
temporal or spatial delimeters, for instance when a new computerized
service decides to document cases only back to a certain date.
One will note that all these types of criteria make it possible to
develop rather strict rules for selection. The type (or producer) of a
legal source is usually self-evident. The procedural characteristics
are made explicit by the source itself. To identify a certain source
within a certain area of law may, of course, be more difficult. A case
settling a labour dispute between performing artists may be labour
law, but also intellectual property law. Though borderlines like this
will always exist, the degree of discretion exercised in qualifying
the source in respect to a legal discipline is quite limited, and
creates no great uncertainty.
These systematic criteria are generally used in determining the
documentation area of a legal information system. It is, of course,
important for the user to have a clear understanding of what area of
law is covered by a system - and the lack of vagueness in these
systematic criteria makes them well suited for the purpose of
determining the documentation area.
Evaluative criteria are generally described in terms like
"important", "central" etc. There are a number of different phrases
used to describe the evaluation to be made by the editor, but they
would all seem to boil down to the criteria being the expert opinion
of the editor. In respect to court decisions, all lawyers would
understand what type of evaluation will take place if "important"
decisions are to be
[Page 56 ]
selected for publication, though they might not necessarily agree
with the actual choices of the editor.
As we have mentioned above, the selection of the sources for
documentation is an essential part of the communication process, and
will decide the performance level of the information system. In spite
of this, little is known of the selection itself, whether or how often
it is controversial, etc.
A special study has been conducted in Norway of three
manual systems with almost identical documentation areas (the
decisions of the Social Security Court). Two of these systems were
inhouse precedent systems in the Social Security Court itself and the
National Insurance Institution, one was a published case reporter. The
study disclosed a surprisingly high degree of independence between the
systems (cfr fig 3/1), indicating that the evaluative selection
criteria may actually have been quite different even when formulated
in a similar way by the editors, and even within a small and
specialized area of law.
Fig 3/1 - Relations between the data bases of three
different information systems with identical documentation areas -
actual and per cent figures, cfr Bing 1982b:213.
SSC = Social Secuity Court (precedent file)
NII = National Insurance Institution (precedent file)
PCR = Published case reports
In calculating per centages, the total number of
different decicisons in the three system is used as a basis.
[Page 57 ]
The studies made seem to indicate that selection based on
evaluative criteria is - perhaps not surprisingly - quite pliable,
being molded by outside interests. In a Norwegian study, it was
observed that the publication of a government report on a certain
legal issue seemed to prompt a higher selection of cases related to
this issue for publication. Other examples of probable outside
influence on the selection are given as well (Bing 1982b:236).
The fact that such procedures may be influenced in this way, is by
itself no reason for alarm or distrust. But it may be a reminder that
this crucial part of the communication process should be given a
critical look from time to time.
The selection criteria may be perceived as governing the selection
process. But they do not by themselves determine which sources will be
included in the information system. One must also look to the
selection procedures. In most cases, the selection is made by one or
a few editors working together - but there are, of course, other
possibilities. The creation of legal sources is to a certain extent
decentralized, and especially in respect to the decisions of the lower
courts, it may be appropriate to have decentralized selection
procedures, for instance using local judges or lawyers.
Many aspects of the selection may be explained only by the
selection procedures. As a curious example may be referred that the
reason for a local Norwegian court not supplying the relevant case
reporter with any material, was explained when it was disclosed that
this court did not have an adequate photocopier, and therefore had
trouble making the necessary copies of the decision (Br&then 1978:10).
Though curious, it may illustrate how vulnerable an information system
is to practical circumstances of this kind.
Finally it should be mentioned that there are a number of other
factors determining the final selection. In conventional paper-based
systems there are considerations to be taken to volume, mail-rates
etc, not to speak of the economic consequences of, for instance,
adding another page to a publication with a great number of
subscribers. Computerized systems change many of these considerations
- and one of the major advantages of computerized systems is that the
sheer
[Page 58 ]
volume of the text is by itself a problem of little importance,
liberating the information service from the chains of paper. On the
other hand, such systems do, of course, introduce new practical
considerations.
3.2.3 The data base
(1) Representativity
We have already introduced the notion of a collection of sources.
From these sources, a number is selected for the information system.
These are then edited according to the needs of the information
system. In the next chapter we shall take a closer look at this
editing, which we have labelled "document design".
At this stage it is sufficient to observe that through the
selection, a data base is created. This data base is composed of
documents, and each document represents one legal source. There
is a complete correspondence between the collection of sources and the
data base both on the aggregated and the individual level.
In order to discuss legal information retrieval systems, we need
some concepts for describing the relation between the collection of
sources and the data base. This is generally the distinction between
unpublished and published sources. Publication plays, of course, a
vital role in any legal system - for instance as a condition for
enforcing a statutory provision (publicatio legis). It is,
however, not this legal aspect of publication that deserves the prime
interest, but the more practical side.
In passing, it may be worth noting that this distinction is of
greater interest in respect to legal than to many other types of
information systems. For instance, the status of a court decision as a
legal source does not generally rest on its publication, but on its
existence (with a few exceptions, as mentioned in respect to the
Californian situation, above at sect 2.4). In a situation with
competing legal information systems, and with the possibility of
actually searching the extensive files of a court or
[Page 59 ]
a public agency, it is important to know to what extent one may
find all the interesting sources through one information system.
In such a case it would be useful to be able to measure to what
extent or how adequatly, a certain data base reflects the
corresponding collection of sources. This is a need which one will not
have with respect to, for instance, chemical literature: One would be
interested to learn how great a fraction of published papers is
available through one information service, but hardly how great a
fraction of all papers on chemistry actually gets published. Rejects
would rarely be of any interest to the learned chemist, while
"rejects" for case reporters may interest a lawyer, and may prove of
great practical use if cited before a court.
In order to compare the two collections, we shall have to determine
a scale. This is attained by referring to the concept of a document
area. This is generally determined by rather strict rules. In applying
these rules to the total volume of legal sources it will be possible
to qualify a sub-set corresponding to the data base of the information
system.
The basic standard is the publication ratio, ie the relation
between the published and total number of sources. If all legal
sources within the documentation area are published, this ratio equals
1 - and the closer to 1, the higher the fraction of published sources.
For a number of important sources, this ratio in practice is 1 -
for instance within the documentation area of statutory law. On the
other hand, one frequently finds quite low fractions. For appeal court
decisions in Norway, this ratio is 0.03 (Br&then 1978:8), which is not
uncommon in a European jurisdiction. When introducing computerized
systems in Great Britain, Butterworth Telepublishing discovered that
less than half of the reported cases were actually published - which
is a surprisingly low publication ratio for the home of the stare
decisis-doctrine.
The publication ratio has, however, one serious disadvantage.
Obviously the legal interest is not equal in all the sources within
the documentation
[Page 60 ]
area. Case law and similar sources often contain trivial or
redundant material. Probably the editor has taken this into account.
If every second decision is trivial or redundant, a publication ratio
of 0.5 would be sufficient to give an excellent service within the
chosen documentation area.
Though this boost of the representativity from editoral assistance
is obvious, it is, however, difficult to measure. The reason is simply
that we would have to base such a measure on the information of the
collection of sources, compared to the information in the data base -
and as "information" (in the semantic sense) cannot be measured,
neither can fractions of information.
It is, however, possible in theory to envision such a measure. The
information in those sources documented by the information system is
measured against the information in all sources. The resulting
fraction will be called representativity.
Actually, the development of the concept of
representativity may be made somewhat more formal than the sketchy
argument above. In using a theory suggested by Schreider (1965) one
may imagine a "semantic thesaurus", and relate the concept of
representativity to changes in this device. For our purposes, however,
the informal introduction above may be sufficent.
Though representativity cannot be measured, its relation to the
publication ratio can be determined. Imagine that we select at random
half the sources within the documentation area for publication. We
would expect to get on an average half the information contained by
the total number of sources. The selection, however, is not the result
of a random process, but rather the product of an editor's expert
choice. An editor would start by peeling away the trivial and
redundant material, thus bringing represenativity a bit above the
publication ratio. Though the representativity would never become 1
until everything were published - even the most trivial scrap of a
source - it would increase faster - as illustrated by fig 3/2.
[Page 61 ]
Fig 3/2 - Relation between publication ratio and
representativity.
This relation illustrates that representativity reaches higher
values than the corresponding publication ratio. It does, however,
also illustrate that representativity is linked to the publication
ratio, and at very low publication ratioes (like the one cited for
Norwegian appeal court cases, 0.03) the representativity cannot be
very high.
We shall not, of course, venture to suggest what would be an
appropriate publication ratio (and, indirectly, neither an appropriate
representativity). It would perhaps be fair to say that the
publication ratio should be as high as possible, and only be reduced
after assessing the consequences. Obviously, the type of legal sources
within the documentation area, the fraction of trivial sources, the
cost of documentation, etc are examples of factors which will
determine what is thought to be an appropriate publication ratio.
Assessments can be made only within a certain documentation area, and
in respect to a certain information system - and should be oriented
towards identifying the justification of a publication ratio less than
1.
The relation to the publication ratio gives to the theoretical
concept of representativity an empirical basis which makes it more
attractive for the analysis of information systems.
The concept of coverage may seem closely related
to the concept of representativity. Coverage
[Page 62 ]
is a measure of how much of the "relevant" documents on
average is contained in the data base of an information system. The
measurement of coverage is clearly related to the situation of the
user, and we shall return to this concept below. At this point
it may be sufficient to mention that representativity (and publication
ratio) tells something of the relation between the data base and the
corresponding collection of legal sources, while the concept of
coverage tells something of the relation between the data base of one
system compared to the combined data bases of all available systems.
(2) Objectivity
Another measure for the quality of the data base is
objectivity. Often the legal sources are gererated when two
parties are in conflict. A typical example (taken from Simitis 1974)
would be labour disputes, where the two parties are the organizations
of the employer and the employee. Such disputes would in some cases be
settled by a court (often a specialized labour court), and the
decisions of this court would then become legal sources for solving
future conflicts.
By objectivity one indicates the ideal aim that the data base
should give a fair reflection of the interests of the parties
involved. If, for instance, only decisions in favour of the employees
were selected for documentation, the data base would become biased
compared to the corresponding collection of sources.
One may note that objectivity has no absolute relation to
representativity. If representativity is high, there may be a
presumption of high objectivity. But obviously the selection may be
biased in such a way that a rather high publication ratio is achieved
with a low objectivity, implying that the majority of those sources
excluded from the information system concern the interest of one of
the parties.
It is perhaps misleading to describe objectivity as a "measure", as
obviously it cannot be measured directly and it will remain a subject
of argument, ie an objective for the information system.
[Page 63 ]
Referring to our previous discussion of selection, one of the
points made concerned the selection according to evaluative criteria.
We maintained that research indicates that these criteria are pliable,
and respond to outside interests. This lead us to suggest that one
should be critical towards selections governed mainly by selective
criteria. One of the critical aspects ought to be precautions against
a loss of objectivity in documentation areas where parties exercise a
strong interest - like that of labour law.
Such precautions may include the amendment of the criteria from
evaluative to a more systematic nature. This possibility is not always
open, as there is no adequate criterion available.
Another possibility would be the development of pluralistic
selection procedures. By involving several parties in the
selection, each of them representing different interests, one may
create some guarantee for adequate objectivity.
An example of such a reform has been found in respect to
the case reporter of the Norwegian Social Security Court. Initially,
this was edited by the National Insurance Institution. It was felt,
however, that as the National Insurance Institution pleaded its point
of view before the Social Security Court, it was itself party of the
conflict, and that its selection might be biased by this fact.
Consequently, in the end of 1975 the selection procedure was changed,
introducing an independent editor who would accept suggestions for
publication from both the Social Security Court and the National
Insurance Institution, and supplement these with his own additions.
When the decisions selected for publication after this amendment was
examined, it was found that 42 per cent were initially suggested by
the National Insurance Institution, and 41 per cent by the Social
Security Court, while only 5 per cent were suggested initially by both
institutions. (For 11 per cent the institution making the initial
suggestion was not known, and the editor played a very minor part in
the initial suggestions.) Cfr Bing 1982b:145-160. This may be
considered a successful reform. Obviously, there
[Page 64 ]
are differences of opinion between the two institutions,
and as these are reflected in the selection, a higher objectivity is
achieved.
The traditional way of securing a sufficently high degree of
objectivity, would be to have competing information systems. The
objectivity of each system may be moderate, but their combination
would achieve a high objectivity.
Also, in this case, the key may be pluralism - but not restricted
to pluralistic selection procedures. The difference between several
competing systems, and one system with pluralistic selection
procedures should, perhaps, not be exaggerated with respect to the
objectivity. In small jurisdictions, however, there may not be a
sufficient market for more than one information system within one
documentation area. This may make the establishment of pluralistic
selection procedures an attractive alternative.
A change from several competing information systems to one
coordinated system may create a concern for the continued
objectivity. And with respect to the introduction of the German
computerized information system JURIS, launched by the Ministry of
Justice, such a concern was voiced. The project director at that time
maintained, for instance (Fabry 1973:6):
"A comprehensive public system would, owing to access
through a certain monopolistic position, necessarily gain importance
as a means of influencing opinion to a high degree. It would,
therefore, be intolerable if such a system were to reduce the
plurality of stored legal points of view or produce a distorted
picture of their quantitative representation."
This strong emphasis on objectivity has a background in the German
discussion, where especially the producers of "conventional"
information services - the German legal publishers - had been very
outspoken on how the freedom of the press as a fundamental principle
in a democratic society produced limits for the growth of the JURIS
system. In a report, the Verlegervereinigung Rechtsinformatik
(1975:19) maintains:
[Page 65 ]
"Einmal wuerde naemlich mit der Verdraengung der
spezialiserten Fachzeitschriften gerade das fuer die Meinungsvielfalt
im juristichen Bereich wesentlichste Informationsmedium entfallen."
As some sort of conclusion, we may indicate that this abstract
reasoning has led us to believe that two characteristics of an
information service may create a concern for its objectivity: low
publication ratio and selection according to evaluative criteria. If
the publication ration is low, this means that a great number of
sources are excluded from the information system, and this enhances
the importance of the selection. And if this selection is governed by
evaluative criteria, the selection will probably be influenced by
outside interests that are not always appearant to the editor himself.
In such cases, one should consider measures to guarantee the
objectivity of the system. We therefore suggest pluralistic selection
procedures.
(3) Updating
The concepts of documentation area, publication ratio,
representativity and objectivity all characterize qualities of the
data base. They do not, however, describe adequately the dynamic
features of the data base, though these features are essential. The
legal system itself is in a state of continuous development, and it is
often important to know some of the dynamic properties of the
information system in order to carry out an evaluation.
One concept, closely related to that of publication ratio, is the
growth of the data bases, measured for instance in the annual increase
of documents. If the publication ratio is stable, the growth will vary
according to the additional number of new legal sources within the
documentation area. This relationship between growth and publication
ratio may be quite common, but in addition there is another tendency.
For a conventional publication, a more or less fixed number of pages
is often available for the annual growth within the documentation
area. Consequently, the annual growth of the data base is quite
stable, but the annual publication rate will vary: In years
[Page 66 ]
of a relative high production of legal sources, the publication
rate will be relatively low; and the opposite will be true in years
with a relatively low production of legal sources. An actual example
is discussed in Bing 1982b:179.
Another concept is the updating frequency. This denotes the
average interval between the updatings of the data base. Updating will
mainly imply the addition of new documents, but may also include the
deletion of outdated documents. For information services documenting
case law, only the first type of updating is actually necessary. For
udating of statutory or regulatory data bases, also the deletion of
outdated sections may be found appropriate. The old sections may,
however, still be important, at least for a period, when deciding
cases originating at a time when these sections were still in force.
Therefore, probably only the status of such dated material will be
changed, in order to facilitate access to the law in force at any
given time.
A time-segmented data base, as indicated above, would
reflect the nature of the legal system itself, in which the validity
of a statutory clause or similar legal instrument is always linked to
dates. However, only few information systems are able to cope with
this. There has been text retrieval systems especially designed with
features to cope with time-segmented data bases, One of these being
the German TR/1 (Kraemer 1975). Another is the Norwegian SIFT,
currently implemented in a prototype version in Oslo and Strasbourg,
and which supports "historical browse". The only operational system
which has a design favouring a time-segmented data base is, to our
knowledge, the French MISTRAL marketed by Honeywell Bull and used, for
instance, in the Common Market CELEX system.
The frequency of updating is, of course, important to the user. The
frequency will vary from systems with weekly, monthly or annual
updating (this is common in respect to manual systems), to systems
with daily or even more frequent updating (as many computerized
systems).
To the user, more important than the updating frequency is the
updating response. The updating
[Page 67 ]
response is defined as the average time from the introduction of
a new legal source into the legal system, until this source is present
as a document in the data base. Obviously, it is hardly of any value
to have daily updating if the material going in is already some months
old.
An aim for the legal information service would be to keep the
update response at a minimum. In Recommendation No R (83) 3 from the
Council of Europe, one of the clauses demands of computerized services
that "the frequency of updating must exactly match the working
environment", ie the legal system itself.
This will possibly have an impact on the very design of legal
information services, which should not include features which prolong
unduly the updating response. Such a feature may be an intellectual
indexing of documents. If this is found desirable, one should seek
solutions which do not have a negative impact on the updating
response. One might, for instance, introduce a two-stage updating, in
which the raw text of the document is introduced in the first stage,
and the elaborations of intellectual indexing in the next.
When measuring the updating response, one is primarily
concerned with the documenting of new legal sources. An information
service may very well document older sources to some extent - for
instance court cases brought to the notice of the editor some time,
even years, after the case was decided. For computerized services, it
is common practice to introduce a data base comprising a certain
number of years, and subsequently supplement the base with older
material at the same time as the system is updated by new sources.
Measuring the average time between creation and updating too rigidly
will make the concept of updating response less useful.
[Page 68 ]
3.3 The editorial process: Document design
3.3.1 Documents
Up to now, we have been using the term "document" without defining
it. It is a convenient term, and is generally used when talking of
computerized systems to denote the unit containing a text etc. In a
manual system, a "document" is a reference to a physical object, one
or several pages of paper. In respect to computerized systems, we
lose this physical reference - and it may be convenient to specify in
some more detail our use of the term "document" - though for most
purposes, the intuitive and rather vague meaning is sufficient.
Our concern is with computerized legal information systems. These
systems will represent legal sources in some way or other. The
representation of a source in a system is what we shall call a
document. The representation may include the authentic form of the
source, or it may be only an abstract or some indexing terms.
Frequently the representation of one source in a system does not
come together in one output format. This is typical for manual
systems. In a case reporter, a case may be represented by its
authentic text and headed by an abstract. But it will also be
mentioned in the table of content and in the back-of-the-book index.
All these elements, representing the same case, constitute one
document in our terminology.
This logical document concept may seem to be a slightly artificial
construction. Our choice is, however, governed by a concern with
document design, where the efforts of the editor is aimed at
presenting a legal source in the information system in a way which is
appropriate for the functions of this system. Important basic
properties of any information system is determined by the selected
document design.
Above we have stated the trivial, but essential observation that a
document cannot be retrieved if
[Page 69 ]
not part of the data base - which leads us to associate
considerable importance to the representativity and publication ratio.
It may be equally trivial, but also equally essential, to observe that
the performance of an information system cannot trancede the
limitation determined by the document design.
In order to determine what is one document, the point of departure
is one legal source. From this source are traced all elements
representing this source in the information system. This gives a fair
working definition of "document".
There are some problems related to this definition, however, but
these do not seem severe, and they do not - in our opinion - involve
any practical difficulties.
One of these problems may nevertheless be mentioned, as it
clarifies the nature of legal source. One will frequently find that
one source cites another source. A court mentions in its decision a
prior decision, this prior decision cites a paper, which in turn cites
a number of decisions and foreign legislation, etc. Imbedded in the
last case are representations of other legal sources.
This may be called the "composite character of legal sources", they
stick together like Chinese boxes, and you cannot have the biggest box
without the smaller within.
If strictly following the definition suggested above, one will find
that when tracing the representation of the cited case, the citation
is itself a representation - and should this then be included within
our logical concept of a document? This would obviously be
inappropriate. The definition could be refined to exclude this small
problem, for instance in pointing out that the document includes only
such elements of representation which are parts of the editoral
scheme, excluding representation caused by activities outside the
system. But for practical purposes it is hardly necessary to refine
the definition of "document".
The distinction between an original text and the
representation of that text in the system, is by Lancaster/Fayen 1973
made by the use of the terms
[Page 70 ]
"document" and "document surrogate", which corresponds
exactly to our distinction between "source" and "document". Our
deviation in terminology is justified partly by the fact that our use
of "document" corresponds fairly well with the use of this term in
respect to computerized systems. But we also think that the term
"document surrogate" is misleading in respect to typical legal
information systems. In such systems, the source is represented in
authentic form. It is not a "surrogate" in the sense that there is
something more "authentic" around.
The terminology of Lancaster/Fayen may be influenced by
their work on bibliographical systems. In such systems, the document
typically contains only elements like title, author, a few indexing
terms etc, perhaps supplemented by a brief abstract. This may be
sufficient for the user to decide that he wants the book or paper
represented, but obviously not sufficient for exploiting the
information of that paper or book: he has to get hold of the original.
In this situation, the term "surrogate" would seem adequate.
Actually, much of the terminology and theory on
information systems are branded by their background in bibliographic
systems, which has functional properties different from the typical
legal text retrieval systems. Therefore, parallels should be drawn
with care.
Within a document, an important distinction is made between those
elements which has an origin outside the system, typically the
authentic form of the source, and those which has been added to the
document by the editorial staff. These additions will typically take
the form of indexing terms, characterizing the source, or an abstract.
Such additions will be the result of an intellectual indexing.
In computerized systems there may be additions which are made more or
less by automatic means - an example might be the enrichment of a
document through the use of an automatic thesaurus by synonyms to the
intellectually selected indexing terms.
Document design invokes the picture of an editor taking a legal
source, tailoring it for the need of the information system and adding
to it abstracts,
[Page 71 ]
indexing terms etc. The document design always takes the legal
source as its point of departure, and this is defined by the
meta-norms of the legal system in question. There are examples within
some jurisdictions for another form than the original to be qualified
as legal sources.
One example may be the ITALGIURE system. Some of the documents in
this system represent the decisions of the Corte suprema di
cassazione. They are represented as the special form of abstracts -
massimes - which are prepared by a special office of the court
itself (cfr below in part III for a description of the system). In
practice, a lawyer argues on the basis of the massimes rather
than on the basis of the original decisions themselves. This may
indicate that in the Italian legal system, not only the original
decisions, but also the carefully prepared massimes are
qualified as legal sources. One the other hand, some are obviously
critical to this view and explain the situation by the fact that as
the massimes are so much easier available, they have
replaced the decisions without this being justified in legal
meta-norms. For a critical discussion, see Ciampi 1974:711-713 and
721-725.
Another interesting example is given by Berger 1981:159-160. The
old German Reichsgericht was careful in drafting its abstracts of the
cases in the form of questions. In its internal files, however, the
court had given the abstracts a more authoritative form. When the
federal court was established in 1950, priority was given to its
functions in developing the law. In order to support this function,
abstracts were now published like maxims or rulings. In addition, the
internal files of the old Reichsgericht was published. This is,
perhaps, one of the causes to the "Leitsatzkult" at present
characterizing German law, where - in Berger's opinion - "ces
sommaries sont souvant traite comme des dispositions legales" and
where "les methodes d'interpretation de leur lois sont appliquees."
Legal meta-norms would seem to have developed to allow for the maxims
to have become some sort of legal sources in their own right.
These complications are mentioned only in order to illustrate the
fact that the authentic form of the legal source may not always be
one form. In the
[Page 72 ]
German situation, one might say that there are two types of legal
sources, the court decisions and the maxims as abstracts of these
decisions. Both have their authentic form - and in addition, the
maxims are a representation of the decision. This is perhaps just one
more example of the composite character of legal sources, and is not
really very different from a legal text book (which is a legal source
with an authentic form) citing and interpreting a certain court
decision.
However, if pragmatic circumstances make the user replace a legal
source with a text unqualified as such a source the situation could
become problematic. In the critic's view of the Italian situation,
what may happen is that the massimes are readily available, and
though not a legal source in their own right, they replace the less
available court decisions for all practical purposes.
There may be several aspects of concern in this situation. One of
them is what Simitis (1974:32) has called "das Manipulationsdilemma":
"... jede Dokumentation, die sich aus ausgewaehlten und
bearbeiteten Texten zusammensetz, (ist) suspekt. Deshalb sind
gegenwaertig nur Dokumentationen akzeptabel, die dank einer
Minimisering der Eingriffe in das vorhandene Material auch eine
Minimisierung der Manipulationschancen ermoeglichen. Die Entwicklung
von Dokumentationssystemen, de Texte rezepieren, ohne sie zu
veraendern, ist die technologische Antwort auf die politische
Foerderung nach unmanipulierte Information."
We shall recognize this concern as the concern for
objectivity, this time not the objectivity in selecting the
data base, but the objectivity in designing the document. Actually,
most concerns relevant to the selection of data base is, on a lower
aggregate level, reflected in the design of documents. It would, for
instance, be possible to develop a concept of representativity and
publication ratio comparing a legal source and a document representing
that source. These issues do not, however, seem as important with
respect to document design as with respect to data base selection, and
will not be pursued further.
[Page 73 ]
"Document design" invokes, as mentioned, the impression
of a pre-existing legal source. There may, however, be some
exceptions to this rule. In some public agencies (the example given
being the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman), a decision is made through a
correspondence with the parties. These decisions are legal sources,
and they are consulted as precedents, at least within the agency in
question. There exists, however, no letter summing up the
circumstances of the case and concluding with a decision similar to
that of a court. In order to represent the sources as documents in the
computerized system, a process of not only document design, but rather
"document construction" was necessary, cfr Tysland 1979:140-142.
Below, we shall discuss in detail the document design. We shall
start by describing three typical forms of documents and their
properties. We shall then introduce the major functions of an
information system, and compare in turn each type of document to these
major functions - in this way indicating their influence on the
functional performance of information retrieval systems.
It will be appreciated that the literature relevant to what we have
called "document design" is extensive, especially on methods for
indexing and abstracting. We shall not, of course, try to adequatly
summarize this literature, but be more concerned with our own
perspective, indicated by the process of designing documents for legal
information retrieval systems.
3.3.2 Three typical forms of documents
(1) Indexes
Indexes are well-known forms of documents, also from conventional
legal information systems - all books or compilations will contain
some form of an index.
The literature on indexing is extensive, and includes discussions
of different types of indexing systems
[Page 74 ]
and their properties. This wealth of literature will not be
summarized here. A few types of indexes will be briefly mentioned with
some comments on automatic index production and examinations of
indexes in legal information systems.
One does often distinguish between subject indexes and
key-term indexes, cfr Seipel 1976:73. In a subject index, the
indexing term will refer to those documents which treats the subject
characterized by the term, even when the document itself does not
contain that exact term. In a key-term index, one will have references
only to documents actually containing the same term as the index.
Obviously, subject indexes are more ambitious than key-term indexes.
Behind the subject index is an understanding of the text of the
document, and often a claim of the indexing term being an appropriate
characteristic of the content of the document. Surprisingly, one will
find that indexes are often of the more simple key-term nature rather
than the more ambitious subject nature.
Another distinction is between free and defined use of
indexing terms. When indexing terms may be selected freely, the
indexer selects those terms at any time found most appropriate to
characterize the document. As this assessment will be relative to time
and persons, there will easily occur inconsitencies in the indexing.
To reduce such inconsistencies, one may introduce definitions of the
indexing vocabulary and the use of indexing terms. These definitions
may be introduced in different ways, a common method is the definition
of a vocabulary to be used when indexing. Often the vocabulary has
definitions of the different terms, and prescriptions for their use
such as distinctions between related terms, relations to other terms
etc. The indexer will not use terms that are not included in the
vocabulary in a different way without - through prescribed procedures
- having revised the indexing vocabulary.
An indexing vocabulary with definitions of the terms are
traditionally known as a thesaurus. Such a thesaurus is a tool
for indexing, for document design - and is brought into play at a
stage prior to the inclusion of the document in the information
system. In respect to computerized legal information services,
thesauri have come to mean mainly certain aids for retrieving
documents. Though these two types of
[Page 75 ]
thesauri may be similar, and though the indexing thesaurus may be
used also for assisting retrieval, they should not be confused.
Consequently, in this book we shall reserve the term "thesaurus" for
those used in assisting retrieval where not otherwise indicated.
A defined indexing vocabulary is, in practice, necessary for
constructing a hierarchical index. A hierarchical index has a tree
structure, ie in climbing the tree, one moves from specific to more
general terms.
In order to construct such a hierarchical index, it is necessary to
have an extensive knowledge of the content of the documents to be
indexed, which means the subjects under discussion. Such hierarchical
structures may often be challenged, and may become outdated -
reflecting an understanding different from the prevailing one.
A typical example of hierarchical indexes are those systematic
tables often used in legal publication as a supplement to a subject
index. These are usually rather traditional in their design, and
probably do not reflect the current understanding of the legal system
in question. But often tradition itself - the experience in mastering
a certain structure - is of great importance for the users of the
index. So though one may disagree with the relations implied by the
structure, one may still find sufficient reason for not changing the
structure.
Different from a hierarchical index is a flat index. In such
an index, no attempts have been made to specify internal relations
between the indexing terms. These are perhaps more common than the
hierarchical indexes.
A last type of indexes with interesting properties are the
citation indexes. As indexing terms a citation index has
identifiers of certain legal sources, like a case citation. Reference
is made to other sources related to the indexing term. The reference
is a claim that there exists some sort of relation between the two
sources of a sufficient strength to justify the reference. This
relation may be authentic, meaning that there is an explicit
citation in the text of at least one of the sources to the other
source, or it may be editorial, meaning that the
[Page 76 ]
claim is based on the indexer's understanding of the two sources.
In Anglo-American law, case citators are widely used in order to
identify precedents. One of the well-known American case-citators,
Shephard's, have actually been implemented as part of both the WESTLAW
and LEXIS service.
A possible measure for the depth of indexing, is the relative
indexing volume (cfr Seipel 1976:7). This is defined as the
relation between number of indexing terms (n) and the number of
indexed documents (m), making the relative indexing volume n/m.
An important practical aspect is how indexes are produced.
The traditional method may be called intellectual indexing. An
indexer assigns indexing terms to each document according to the rules
governing the indexing.
The disadvantages of this method are at least twofold. Firstly, it
will take time. This period may cause a delay from the production of
the legal source to its inclusion into the data base, prolonging the
updating response. Secondly, even quite simple indexing will demand
quite a high standard of expertise from the indexer. This is a
difficult problem - not least within small jurisdictions, where it may
be difficult to offer sufficient conditions to experienced lawyers, to
inspire them to tackle the often routine indexing work. Obviously, the
indexing will add extra cost to the providing of the information
service, and a commercial service will be able to offer sophisticated
indexing only if the market is big enough to pay for this additional
cost.
This is a generally acknowledged problem, cfr Campbell
1975 on the situations in the Northern-Irish and Scottish
jurisdictions. Cfr also Kornerup 1969, who maintains that the French
extensive use of indexes may be related to the organization of their
legal education making available a number of well qualified lawyers at
the universities.
An alternative to intellectual indexing, would be automatic
indexing.
[Page 77 ]
In order to make possible such an automatic indexing one must be
able to define strict rules for the production of an index on the
basis of the text of the documents (or defined parts of the text).
Obviously, flat key-term indexes would be easiest to produce in this
way, though in using thesauri and other techniques, somewhat more
sophisticated indexes might be produced.
Automatic indexing would not imply the two disadvantages mentioned
in relation to intellectual indexing, but would presume that the text
to be indexed is in machine-readable form and that appropriate
programs are available. The economic relation would depend, on the one
hand, upon the expences incurred by qualified indexers, and, on the
other hand, upon the expences incurred by the converting of the text
to a machinereadable form, and for the use use (perhaps even
development of) an adequate program.
The greatest controversy with respect to automatic indexing
concerns, however, the qualitative aspect. Obviously, intellectual
indexing implies the possibility of achieving a higher quality in the
indexes. This possibility is, however, not always achieved.
In an examination of 1.575 references in ten different
Swedish legal indexes, Seipel determined which terms would have been
assigned the documents by a simple automatic indexing scheme and which
probably or definitley would not. The automatic indexing was presumed
to be made with only the title as input. On average, he found that 36
per cent of the indexing terms would not have been assigned by
automatic methods. The ratio varied, however, from 6 to 86 per cent,
cfr Seipel:106-109. There exists, however, methods for improving the
results.
However, if an information service employs computers, the
production of conventional indexes becomes only one of several
possibilities. In a text retrieval system, an index is also produced -
ie the search file. Taking the documents, the system will construct an
alphabetic index containing all words occuring in all documents. Each
word is associated with a reference indicating the position of the
word in the text file. This reference is generally an address giving
document identification, sentence-number within the
[Page 78 ]
document and word-number within the sentence. In practice, not
all words are treated like this - a small number of predefined
stop-words is excluded - words like prepositions ("in", "for", "on"),
pronouns ("she", "it"), cojunctions ("and", "but", "when"), and verbs
like "have", "be", and "ought"). By excluding such words, the total
number of text words will be reduced by some 40-50 per cent, while the
number of different words will be only fractionally reduced. In
a Norwegian statutory text of 118 069 text words, the 100 most
frequent words made up 55 per cent of the text (cfr Harvold 1976:12).
Usually, one distinguishes between the index and the text or
documents characterized by the indexing terms. This distinction
becomes less obvious when the index is produced like in a text
retrieval system, since the content of the index is identical with the
content of the text itself, the "only" difference being that they are
sorted differently (alphabetically rather than in sentences), and
exclude certain stop-words. Therefore, one usually describes the
retrieval process as "searching the text", while it is actually a
searching of indexes to the text.
(2) Abstracts
The abstract is also well-known to lawyers. Case reporters usually
bring abstract of the cases as a head-note.
By "abstract" we mean an abbreviated representation of the source
in natural language. Typically, this is a description of the content
of the source. This may be rather brief and take on the form of a
title or headline, or it may be quite extensive - though this would be
rare - giving a lengthy report on the content of the source.
In our terminology, the main point of difference between
indexes and abstracts is the natural language of the abstract - the
source is characterized by full sentences, not only indexing terms.
The borderline between indexes and abstracts is blurred, cfr the use
of "telegraphic
[Page 79 ]
abstracts" where a defined vocabulary is used, and where
the terms of the abstract may be sorted into alphabetical indexes -
cfr Borko/Bernier 1975:18-20. A traditional definition of an abstract
would be
"... an abbreviated, accurate representation of a
document without added interpretation or critisism and without
distinction as to who wrote the abstract". Weil cited after
Borko/Bernier 1975:4.
This definition is not used in our book for several
reasons. Obviously, we use the term "document" in a different way,
indicating the abstract, rather than the source it represents. But in
addition we doubt whether an abstract can be produced "without added
interpretation" or "without distinction as to who wrote the abstract".
Abstracts may be classified according to the type of author. One
important category is represented by those abstracts written by an
author who wrote the source as well, for instance an abstract of a
case written by the judge himself. The advantages of such abstracts
would be the author's first hand knowledge of the text he was
abstracting. The disadvantages would be the author's lack of
experience in following the rules for abstracting. It is maintained
that the author of the original text may easily distort it in an
abstract, Borko/Bernier 1975:13-14.
In case reporters, it is not uncommon that the judges themselves,
or someone employed by the court, produces the abstract. This is for
instance done by the administrative courts of Sweden. - At the Italian
Corte suprema di cassazione, high priority is given to the production
of abstracts. These are produced by a special office of the court,
Ufficio del massiario e del ruolo. In the period of 1942-49 it was
experimented with letting the judges themselves produce the abstracts.
This, however, was not considered to bring results - the abstracts
became too specific with respect to facts and too abstract with
respect to the law, cfr Ciampi 1974:722.
The general opinion is that the best abstracts are produced by an
expert within the field, who has the necessary training to obey the
rules for document
[Page 80 ]
design as well. Legal publishers of case reports will furnish
examples of such expertise in abstracting, and many have a reputation
for producing headnotes of a high quality.
Another distinction exists between informative and
descriptive abstracts. In informative abstracts the aim is to
present all factual information of the original - ie facts,
conclusions etc. An informative abstract may therefore replace the
original. A descriptive abstract would describe which problems are
discussed in the original, but does not aim at containing sufficient
information to be used independently of the original source.
This distinction may be less clear With respect to legal
sources than with respect to literature within certain other
disciplines, where the main points of an original may be given as
clear conclusions. But obviously the distinction indicates a scale.
Often abstracts in legal systems are associated with a representation
of the authentic text, which is typical for the headnotes of a case
reporter. In this context, the abstracts become descriptive - the
authentic text is at hand for use in the legal arguments. In other
contexts - as in a text-book or a commentary - the abstract is given
independently of the authentic text. In these instances, there would
seem to be an inclination towards using the arguments derived only
from the abstract. Here informative abstract may seem appropriate.
This, however, would have to be assessed with respect to whether it
seems desirable - or, indeed, permitted - to encourage a replacement
of the source by the abstract.
In addition to the abstract proper, there are a few types of
documents which will not be distinguished from abstracts unless
called for by the context. One is the extract. An extract is
identical with the authentic text of a source, but is only a selected
part of it. Another is what may be called a report of the
source. The report seeks to give a complete representation of the
authentic text, but is not necessarily identical to this. The reason
for selecting the form of a report, may be the need for document
construction - a situation where no appropriate
[Page 81 ]
authentic form of the document is at hand.
The abstracts may also be free abstracts or normalized
abstracts. In principle, the abstracts may be constructed only
from defined indexing terms. This would be much rarer with respect to
abstracting than to indexing. More common, there will be certain rules
for the design of the abstact - for instance the naming of an author
or court, date, standards for abbreviations, citations etc. There may
also be other guidelines, like the abstract being constructed out of
general rather than specific terms.
Measures for the quality of abstracts are not in common use.
Consequently, one will have to rely mostly upon user experience.
This is also the first item of the list presented by
Borko/Bernier 1975:180. In addition is mentioned the degree of which
the abstract conforms to the rules of the information system or other
norms for the construction of abstracts, the absence of errors,
consistency, readability etc.
An alternative, presented by Mathis (and cited from Borko/Bernier
1975:182) is what is called "data coefficient". This measure rests on
the identification in the abstract and in the authentic text of "data
elements", defined as "one concept", represented by "name-relation-
name patterns", again defined as "language strings composed of words
representing names and relations". Borko/Bernier 1975:183 holds this
method to be the most precise offered at present to measure the
quality of abstracts. The assessment of the method would seem to rely
completely on how feasable one would regard the possibility of
identifying "data element".
The conventional method for producing abstracts is to have a
qualified abstracter read the authentic text and then formulate
briefly his understanding of the text. The disadvantages of this
method is the same as with respect to intellectual indexing - it is
time-consuming and requires abstracts of advanced qualifications.
Perhaps the time consumed in writing abstracts are even more extensive
than in indexing, as the abstract must reflect more completely the
authentic text. A strategy to reduce the time consumption, would be to
let the author of the authentic text
[Page 82 ]
produce the abstract as well.
Attempts have been made for automatic abstract production. This is
a rather more ambitious task than to produce automatic indexes, as
the abstract has to be formed in natural language. And it is rather
complicated to have a computer cope with natural language. So far only
experimental schemes have been devised.
Also, automatic abstracting would presume that the authentic text
was machine readable. In such a case the need for an abstract would be
reduced, as other methods may be employed to fulfil the functions of
an abstract - for instance focusing, highlighting or KWIC-formats.
(3) Authentic text
The least complicated form of representing a source, would be to
reproduce the authentic text of the source in the document. This is
the usual way of representing most types of sources - statutes,
regulations, court decisions etc.
As mentioned above, what is the authentic form of a source will be
determined by the meta-norms of the legal system in question. It is
conceivable that the authentic form is actually an abstract of another
and more extensive text - cfr the examples given above from Italy and
Germany.
The authentic text will typically be part of the document in a
legal information system, but will rarely constitute the complete
document. In addition, the document will usually contain indexing
terms and an abstract.
Also, the editor may have made some amendments in the autentic
text. He may have deleted the name of the parties for privacy reasons,
and he may have abbreviated the text in different ways, for instance
by excluding some of the formulas often introducing a decision.
Actually, there is a blurred borderline between an extract and the
authentic text.
There are some disadvantages of representing a source
[Page 83 ]
by its authentic text. Firstly, the authentic text will be
relatively lenghty. In situations where costs are relative to length,
this will be an argument for a briefer representation.
This has been an important argument for computerized
systems. For older material, the text had to be re-keyed in order to
convert it into machine readable form. Here cost would be proportional
to the number of key-strokes, and it would be tempting to only re-key
the abstracts or headnotes of cases etc, which would be relatively
cheaper.
Secondly, in authentic text one would have to accept the
ideosyncracies of the author. This would hardly be a severe problem,
since the author would be expected to respect the norms of the written
language. One would, however, expect many inconsistencies in the terms
used. And with respect to multi-lingual documentation areas, like
international law, it might create problems. Corresponding problems
might be found in jurisdictions with more than one official language -
like Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland or Switzerland. In such
situations, information systems will have to develop special features
to cope with the multilinguism.
3.3.3 Functional performance
(1) Introduction
Functional performance is a measure for how well an information
system fulfils certain functions defined as desirable or necessary.
These functions are rather simple and basic. The three major functions
are
- (1) the retrieval function, ie the ability to identify possible
relevant documents within the data base;
- (2) the relevance function, ie the ability to easily determine the
relevance of a retrieved document with respect to an actual problem;
and
- (3) the source function, ie the access to a document representing
the source in such a way
[Page 84 ]
that arguments for legal reasoning can be derived from
the document.
In addition there may be a fourth function, namely the current
awareness function, bringing to the notice of the user important new
developments or other changes of the law.
These are all functions of an information system. In this section,
we shall discuss only the functional performance relating to
document design: what influence will document design have on
functional retrieval. Obviously, there may also be other features of
the information system that will have an impact on functional
performance. The search language will concern the performance of the
retrieval function, the focusing or highlighting will concern the
relevance function etc. But the document design will actually limit
the performance of these functions, and is therefore discussed
separately in relation to each of them.
One should also be aware of the restriction of the discussion to
document design in contrast to information systems.
There are systems mainly designed to support only one of the functions
- like an official gazette bringing all statutory amendments: this
will be excellent in relation to the current awareness function, but
inadequate with respect to the other functions. A citation index may
be useful as a retrieval tool, but will not satisfy the other
functions at all. Consequently it should be stressed that though the
functional performance of one legal information system assessed
isolated may seem one-sided, the individual information services often
have to be assessed in relation to each other as complementary
services. This is also true for computerized legal information
services, which for the foreseeable future will exist as part
of the total information environment of the user rather than as that
environment itself.
[Page 85 ]
(2) The retrieval function
An information service should permit the user, when specifying a
question, to retrieve documents of possible relevance to this
question.
In practice, only different types of indexes can fulfil the
retrieval function of a system. In the index certain properties of the
documents are characterized and sorted according to certain criteria -
for instance alphabetic, systematic etc. The user may then formulate a
search request which in the same way characterizes properties of his
problem. In matching the request with the index he may find a
reference to a document which is thus indentified as being of a
probable relevance.
In theory other methods for retrieval may perhaps be conceivable.
The simplest method would be to read sequentially through all
documents in the data base in the random sequence they occur with
respect to the problem. This method is not very efficient, but from
time to time it may be the only choice, because there may be no index
to the data base, or the existing indexes, have not been designed to
cope with the user's type of problem.
Indexes presume the existence of indexing terms in a document -
perhaps with the small exception of table of content and similar
indexes, which may be constructed out of very brief summaries (as
mentioned above, the exact borderline between indexes and abstract is
somewhat blurred).
It is quite unnecessary to discuss to what extent abstracts or
authentic texts satisfy the functional requirements for retrieval. It
is important to state the basic observation that in theory and
practice the problem-oriented use of an information system presumes an
index.
Otherwise one would be limited to sequentional reading of shorter
or longer documents. This is not impossible, and represents a method
to which most lawyers have had to resort from time to time. But
undoubtedly documents containing only abstracts or authentic text
satisfy the retrieval function less satisfactorily than indexes.
[Page 86 ]
In order to avoid misunderstanding, one should bear in
mind that the form of index used in text retrieval systems is produced
on the basis of the authentic text or abstracts. But also in these
cases, the retrieval is supported by indexes.
The question then becomes what type of indexes are most efficient.
This question is too general to be appropriately answered, and must be
split into a number of sub-questions. Of these, only a few will be
discussed here, questions which we think have a special interest for
computerized legal information services.
An obvious point of departure would be the question of whether
empirical studies have determined which type of indexing language is
the most appropriate. Above, several possible distinctions have been
indicated - free and defined vocabulary, hierarchical and flat indexes
etc. Several indexing systems are in use, and it would have been
tempting to compare these or examine their efficiency.
There are a number of tests which examines exactly this problem.
Some of the more important are Cleverdon (for instance 1967), Salton
(1971), and Saracevic (for instance 1979b). These three general and
extensive tests had aimed primarily at disclosing which indexing
language was the "better". By "better" is meant a measure for
retrieval performance. The measure used in this book is recall and
precision - but other measures are possible and have been used (for
instance by Saracevic).
Recall and precision will be further discussed in part
II. If the relevant documents are R, the retrieved documents T and the
retrieved, relevant documents are D, then recall is T/R and precision
D/T. Recall and precision both approaches 1 with increasing
performance. They are often illustrated as points or curves in graphs.
It is precarious trying to summarize the results of these major and
basic projects. Nevertheless we would like to focus on a result which
we consider important, but which perhaps have not been fully
appreciated. This result may - somewhat boldly - be formulated as the
disappointment in the performance of
[Page 87 ]
sophisticated and time-consuming indexing systems.
In one of his conclusions, Cleverdon (1967:620) states that an
indexing language characterized as "relatively simple" would seem to
give the best cost-benefit performance, and indicates that in certain
circumstances this may also yield a higher performance. Cleverdon is
careful in his conclusions, but apparently the results justify a
certain scepticism towards sophisticated indexing languages. The
results of Cleverdon are supported by Salton (cfr for instance
Salton/Lesk 1968:639), who states on the relation between intellectual
and automatic indexing (Salton/Lesk 1968/638) that:
"... one is tempted to say that the efforts of trained
indexers may well have been superfluous for the collection at hand,
since equally effective results could be obtained by simple word
matching techniques. Such results appear even more probable in the
case of larger or less homogeneous collections, where the manual
indexing tends to be less effective because of the variabilities among
indexers, and the difficulties ensuring a uniform application of a
given set of indexing rules to all documents."
This may have been expressed most pointedly by Saracevic, who, in
one of his general conclusions, stresses that the "human factor" seems
to be the most important one with respect to retrieval performance. In
the choice between indexing languages and systems, he states
(1970b:680):
"The length of indexes (i.e. variations in number of
index terms per index as produced from titles, abstracts, or full
texts) seems to affect the performance considerably more that do the
indexing languages; given the same length (often termed 'depth')
various indexing languages tend to perform at an equivalent level."
When underscoring this scepticism in relation to sophisticated
indexing methods, for instance employing input thesauri for term
control, it is done mainly to justify the opinion that in legal
information systems large resources should not be used on indexing.
Indexing is essential, since indexes are in practice the only way of
supporting the retrieval
[Page 88 ]
function. But perhaps simpler and cheaper indexing schemes may be
sufficient.
The selection of indexing structure and languages as well as
methods for the production of indexes, cannot be assessed
independently of those retrieval strategies supported by the
information system in question. In printed indexes, few retrieval
strategies are open for the user - in practice a request has to take
the form of one indexing term, to which the references are
identified. In systematic indexes (or other types of hierarchical
indexes) one is permitted to move up and down the levels of
generalization. Some have certain other features, and some may be used
in conjunction, for instance in retrieving a statutory clause through
a subject index, and then follow the references in the annotations to
the clause.
Citation indexes and their performance are not mentioned
above. The use of citation indexes for retrieval of scientific
literature is found very handy by the users - cfr for instance the
assessment of Science Citation Index cited by Martyn 1965:360.
One must suppose that similar results are achieved through citation
indexes for legal sources. Empirical research seems to indicate -
perhaps not surprisingly - that the indexing by way of citations is
remarkably consistent (for statutory citations, cfr Bing
1982b:221-228. Users maintain that citation indexes are important, cfr
Technical Study I 1977:55-56).
Computerized systems give the user a wider range of retrieval
strategies. In this context it is sufficient to observe that they will
permit forms of indexes which for practical purposes are excluded in
respect to printed publications. In particular this includes indexes
produced automatically on the basis of the text of a document,
containing nearly all the different word forms of a data base with
information (addresses) of the position of the words in the data base
of documents.
An issue of concern would be whether such indexes permit a higher
retrieval performance than would indexes produced by intellectual
indexing. One may envision data bases representing the same legal
sources. In one data base, the indexing terms have been assigned by a
qualified indexer, in the other the
[Page 89 ]
indexing terms have been gererated automatically on the basis of
the text of the documents (presumably of the authentic text or of
abstracts of the sources).
This issue is perhaps not yet settled. In the development of
computerized legal information systems in Europe, there has been a
tendency in Latin countries to favour intellectual indexing, while in
Great Britain and Scandinavia (especially Sweden) there have been used
documents containing only authentic texts. This has been considered a
conflict between indexing and full text systems, cfr Bing/Harvold
1977:80.
At present the conflict is not a matter of great concern, not
because the issue has been settled, but perhaps because all systems
work more or less with documents partly containing the authentic text
completely or in extract, partly at intellectually assigned indexing
terms and abstracts.
We do not want to solve the conflict in this connection. It is
sufficient to mention that no empirical test has shown intellectual
indexing to be clearly more effective than automatic indexing, and
that automatic indexing of authentic text in a computerized system
usually will be cheaper, and also satisfy the source function. We also
refer to Salton/Lesk 1968, as cited above, where one of the results
was the failure of determining that automatic indexing was inferior to
intellectual indexing.
At the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, Oslo
University, a number of "controlled experiments" in text retrieval
have been carried out. None of these justify a general assessment of
the respective merits of automatic or intellectual indexing. In two of
the experiments, however, recall failure due to "implicity" is
determined - this failure occurring if some ideas in the authentic
text are not made explicit, but are rather implied by the context. It
has been maintained that this is a type of performance failure more
common in automatic than in intellectual indexing, as the intellectual
indexing tries to disclose such implicity by assigning explicit
indexing terms on the basis of the indexer's understanding of the
content.
In both experiments implicity was found to be the cause of 12 per
cent of recall failure. This means
[Page 90 ]
that in 12 per cent of the cases where an idea in a document was
not retrieved, this was caused by content being implied rather than
explicitly stated by the words of the document.
Note that the figures refer to the recall failure. In 12
per cent of the cases where an idea of a document is not found,
the cause was implicity. - The two experiments mentioned was conducted
on data bases of decisions by Swedish administrative courts
(Bing/Harvold 1974:102) and by the Norwegian Social Security Court
(Bing/Harvold/Kjonstad/Stabell 1976:104).
The experimental results cited are very encouraging. Recall failure
due to implicity in natural language documents would not seem to be
more severe than the failure in intellectual indexing caused by
failure to include a relevant indexing term or incorrect assignment of
terms.
In Lancaster's (1969:646) examination of the medical
information system MEDLARS the indexing itself caused 37.4 per cent
of the recall failure, and of this the cause "insufficiently
exhaustive" made up 20.3 per cent. The results cannot, of course, be
compared directly, but do demonstrate that there are problems
corresponding to "implicity" playing a considerable part as a cause of
recall failure also for intellectual indexing.
The second problem would be what type of document was most
appropriate for automatic indexing - which type of document results in
the best indexes for retrieval purposes.
In this respect, one may suggest three possibilites: documents
consisting of titles (which may count as very brief abstracts),
abstracts and documents based on the authentic text.
As mentioned above, Saracevic (1970b:680) maintained that retrieval
performance was more dependent upon the length of the index than upon
the indexing language. As titles are briefer than abstracts, and
abstracts briefer than authentic texts, one might suppose this last
type of documents gave the best results. This is supported by the
tests of Saracevic
[Page 91 ]
(1970b:674 and 1968:87-95). Cleverdon's tests indicate that
indexes based on titles do not perform as well as those based on
abstracts (1967:619 fig 14). Salton/Lesk (1968:630) conclude:
"... document abstracts are more effective for content
analysis purposes than document titles alone; further improvement
appear possible when abstracts are replaced by larger text portions;
however, the increase in effectiveness is not large enough to reach
the unequivocal conclusion that full text processing is always
superior to abstract processing."
In one of the controlled experiments in text retrieval at the
Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, performance in
retrieving on abstract-based indexes are compared with retrieval on
"full text"-based indexes, cfr Fjeldvig 1976:95-111.
The documents in the experiment was responsaes from the Tax
Administration, where the abstract was produced by the editor of a
specialized journal (Utvalget). In fig 3/3 the result is given
as three curves, each curve referring to a certain type of document:
abstract, extract of the authentic text without abstract, and extract
of the authentic text with abstract (Fjeldvig 1976:104).
Fig 3/3 - Average recall-precision curves for three
different types of documents.

[Page 92 ]
(3) Relevance function
The "relevance function" denotes the function of documents in a
retrieval system as one to give efficient means for determining the
relevance of a source represented by the documents.
If a document contains the authentic text of the source, this is
taken as the best possible form for determining relevance. It is
indeed difficult to see how alternative document designs could offer
the user a better foundation for relevance assessment than the one
offered by the authentic text.
Cfr Saracevic 1970b:678, who characterizes the relevance
assessment on other bases than the authentic text preliminary with
respect to his text. - One might mention that the relevance concept
used in this book presumes the existence of a legal problem. It is
therefore a condition that the user, before making his final relevance
assessment, has access to a document satisfying the "source function",
ie a document qualified as satisfying the legal meta-norms for being
utilized in the legal argument, cfr below at (3).
The disadvantage of basing the assessment on the authentic text is,
in practice, that it is relatively long. The length itself may demand
of the user to spend considerable resources assessing the relevance of
the documents retrieved by the system. Cfr Persson (1974:79) who has
found a clear accordance between the length of the text and the time
required for relevance assessment. There are certain ways of reducing
these disadvantages through the system design (rather than the
document design), but the usual way is to design an alternative and
briefer representation of the source, and include this in the
document.
One way to improve the relevance function for long
documents, is the inclusion in the computerized system of a focusing
or KWIC function (KWIC being an acronym for "key word in context").
The user retrieves a set of documents, and wants to examine these to
assess their possible relevance. The system presents the documents on
the screen displaying that part of the document which contains one or
more search terms. This location of
[Page 93 ]
the document is probably important for the relevance
assessment. The function is regarded favourably by users of such
systems, cfr Bing/Harvold 1977:127-128.
Another strategy is known as "highlighting", ie the search terms
are highlighted on the screen by higher intensity print or reverse
video as they appear on the screen. This also facilitates the
relevance assessment of long documents.
One will note that these are features of the system, not of the
documents. In this section we shall mainly consentrate on how document
design may facilitate relevance assessment. One should, however, be
aware that document design is not the only feature determining the
relevance function of the overall system.
If a document in authentic text is to have an alternative and
briefer representation, the choice is between indexing terms and
abstracts.
Indexing terms give little possibility of relevance assessment
beyond the implicit assessment of the retrieval itself. The reason for
the choice of certain search terms, and the retrieval of a set of
documents, is closely related to the probability of finding relevant
documents. Search requests may be regarded as a hypothesis of the
properties of a relevant document.
Users may also, as part of the retrieval process, suggest that
documents retrieved by term "a" has a higher probability of being
relevant than those retrieved by term "b". He may sort documents in
different sets using such properties (ranking), for instance by
specifying that those documents found both by term a and
term b has a higher probability of being relevant than those
containing only one of the terms.
It is the ability of the system to formulate appropriate
hypothesises of this kind which is measured by recall and precision. A
retrieval system efficient in recall and precision, will also be
efficient in this limited form of relevance assessment.
Indexing terms should be regarded as part of the retrieval function
rather than, in this context, part of
[Page 94 ]
the relevance function.
It is perhaps of interest to dwell somewhat on the
distinction between the relevance and retrieval functions. To
facilitate retrieval, the document element in question has in practice
to be part of an index. In text retrieval systems, all elements of the
document will be part of the search file, and this distinction is not
as obvious as in a manual system. Imagine, however, a manual system
with a number of indexing cards, each card representing one case and
all cards indexed with statutory citations. The retrievable index is
the small flags bearing the different citations, and sorted into the
file behind the flag are those cases characterized by the citation.
When the citation is used as a search term, all cards behind the flag
are retrieved. When determining relevance, the user will examine
titles, additional indexing terms etc, which may be elements of the
card. Here it is obvious what is retrieval and what is relevance
assessment. But over time dynamic factors may change this. The number
of cards for one citation may grow out of proportion, and this is then
split into sub-citations on the level, for instance, of paragraphs
rather than sections. The information of paragraphs ceases to be
utilized in the relevance function and is utilized already in the
retrieval - the paragraph citations now being part of a search file.
The other alternative for representation of legal sources in a
brief format is the abstract. It is commonly accepted that the
abstract is appropriate for making relevance assessment more efficient
- this is also the justification for using head-notes in conventional
publication. This intuitive attitude is also supported by the test
done by Saracevic (1970b:679):
"... in comparison with full texts, approximately two
thirds of relevant answers from titles and three fourths from
abstracts (were recognized by users). At the same time they recognized
ninetysix per cent of nonrelevant answers from titles and ninety-eight
per cent from abstracts."
This indicates that a relevance assessment on the
[Page 95 ]
basis of abstracts (or titles, which in this context may be
regarded as a very brief abstract) is reasonably efficient.
With respect to the results of Saracevic, one should be
aware that his relevance concept is not identical to that used in this
book, cfr Saracevic 1970b:571. This should not, however, reduce the
general value of the conclusions. Below in fig 3/4 we cite the values
given by Saracevic for relevance. In the table, "R" is "relevant", "P"
is "partially relevant" and "N" is for "nonrelevant". As the relevance
concept in this book is binary, probably also "partially relevant"
should be considered "relevant" in our terminology. The table
illustrates how assessments based on abstracts are distributed
relative to assessment based on authentic text.
Fig 3/4 - Relevance assessment based on abstracts, cfr
Saracevic 1970b:679 table IV.
| | | Full | Text | Judgements |
| | | 207 | 156 | 723
|
| | | R | P | N |
| |
175 R | 160 | 3 | 12 |
| Abstract | 169 P | 23 | 125 | 21 |
| Judgements | 742 N | 24 | 28 | 690 |
Saracevic explains the deviations between the relevance assessment
based on abstracts and authentic texts by the less exhaustive content
of the abstracts. He indicated, however, that also the uncertainty of
the user or development over time of the understanding of the user may
contribute to the explanation. We would consider it improbable that a
better correlation between results would be obtained by comparing the
relevance assessment of one user at two different points in time, each
time based on the authentic text. For an example of user changes in
relevance assessment, cfr Bing/Harvold/Kj&nstad/Stabell 1976:57-61 and
Kj&nstad 1976.
[Page 96 ]
(4) The source function
Under sect 3.3.1 we have discussed briefly the qualification of
what is the authentic form of a legal source. This depends entirely on
the legal meta-norms of a legal system, which qualify what form a
document will have for a lawyer to be permitted to derive arguments
from it and incorporate these arguments into a legal reasoning.
It has been stressed that any representation qualified by the
meta-norms of a system in this way, is an authentic form of the
legal source. Examples have been offered with reference to the Italian
and German legal systems, of which may be maintained that abstracts of
court decisions are treated as a legal source, and that these
abstracts have an authentic form though being a briefer representation
of the original court decision as well.
Earlier we have also dwelt on the composite character of legal
sources, and mentioned that when citing one source - for instance a
court case - we may indirectly draw upon other sources in turn cited
by that case. Our arguments are derived from the case, but their
weight may to a large extent be determined by the cited sources.
After this reminder of some of the concepts and the terminology
underlying the phrase "authentic text", we move on to the third major
function of a legal information system: the communication to the user
of a text which satisfy the meta-norms of the legal system, and which
may be utilized in his legal argument. This is what will be called the
source function of the system.
In our terminology it is somewhat of a pleonasm to maintain that
the source function is satisfied only by the authentic form of the
source, as both the source function and the authentic form is
qualified with a reference to the same legal meta-norms. However, a
more practical observation may be added to this: In general the
authentic form will in general be the text as produced by the original
author - who may be a legislator, a judge, a civil servant or a
[Page 97 ]
legal author. No abstract of this original text will be generally
qualified as a source (though exceptions may exist and have been
indicated), and this will be even more true for indexing terms. Of the
three types of documents mentioned above, only the one which in our
terminology is an "authentic text" may serve the source function - and
this will indeed correspond to what is generally called a "full text".
We shall not discuss the source function further, but still stress
that this is absolutely essential to a communication process. If the
source function is not satisfied, the lawyer is not helped at all. It
may be interesting to know that there exists a court decision of
probable relevance and high importance, but nevertheless it must be
considered rather frustrating if that decision is not available in a
form allowing the lawyer to exploit it in a legal argument. Any legal
information system which has not taken into account how to solve the
source function, is at risk.
There will, of course, be legal information systems specialized to
serve only one or two of the major functions - an example would be an
index or digest which serves only the retrieval and relevance
function, characterizing each of the listed sources by indexing terms
and a brief abstract. Such systems have not solved the source
function, and the criticism above may be regarded as relevant to such
systems. This is, however, not necessarily so. Some systems can only
be understood when viewed as supplementary or accessory to other
systems. Though each of the systems has a low functional performance,
the performance increases considerably when they are regarded as one
composite system.
Some of the success of computerized systems is, however, probably
due to the combination of a highly efficient retrieval function and a
nearly unique source function. If the authentic form of the sources is
part of the documents, the source function is literary satisfied by
the touch of a button. Browsing through possible relevant documents is
easier on a screen than in a book, and the fact that trivial things
like turning pages or looking up different volumes have been done away
with, should not be underestimated.
[Page 98 ]
The largest commercial systems are the American systems
of WESTLAW and LEXIS. These mainly contain published court decisions.
One may reflect on the relative importance of the retrieval and
source function in such systems. To a large extent WESTLAW obviously
has a more efficient retrieval function compared to the conventional
case reporters of West Publishing Co, while these conventional
reporters may offer the user a better source function than that of the
computerized system. Though the high availability of identified
documents have been emphasized above, one should bear in mind that the
simple matrix printers of most computer terminals do not offer texts
in a form which can compete with the clear fonts of a printed page. If
the computerized system is used as a retrieval tool for the
conventional library, the source function need not be stressed in that
system. On the other hand, the more independent the computerized
system becomes, and the more unpublished material is documented, the
more vital an appropriate solution will be for the source function,
including document presentation.
Bringing the source function into focus, may disclose the
communication aspect of a computerized system as well. A tendency to
consentrate on the retrieval function of such systems may be
justified, but the simple fact that in such system an identified
document is instantly available in the desired form, may in practice
be equally important.
User research has disclosed the importance of trivial availability
factors, and it is worth noting that the simple fact that the source
was missing from the library was a main cause of the unsatisfactory
result of legal research in a major German survey
(Jungjohann/Seidel/Sorgel/Uhlig 1974:44). This may be combined with
the probably typical result from an Italian survey, demonstrating that
half the lawyers had no particular system in their library, and more
than three quarters had no index to their own library (Rawlence
1975:374- 375).
These facts may indicate that it would indeed be a great practical
boon to the lawyer to have an information system which easily made
available the authentic form of the source, and where the documents
were
[Page 99 ]
never missing due to a simultaneous use by a collegue.
Essential functions should not be neglected. In conclusion, one may
state that any legal information system is only as good as the
source function associated with that function.
(5) The current awareness function
The current awareness function is not one of the major concerns of
document design. This function would be features of a document which
were designed to make the reader aware of a special novelty associated
with the document. For instance a case reporter might, by a special
character, identify those cases which, in the opinion of the editor,
changed the state of law in some area.
There are, however, rarely taken special care to make the documents
support the current awareness function. The explanation for this is
two-fold and rather simple.
Firstly, most legal information systems are published according to
changes or developments in the legal system, thereby announcing that
they may have an interest in keeping a lawyer up to date. No special
measures in the document design of, for instance, a case reporter is
necessary to convey the message to the lawyer - though the headnotes,
considered be wholly justified by the relevance function, may be
convenient for the user when browsing through recently published
reports.
Secondly, in most legal systems, there are dedicated information
systems for satisfying the current awareness function. These, again,
do not really make any special allowances in their document design,
but by their very nature, they will document only what is deemed
necessary in view of their special function.
A typical system would be the official legal gazette common to many
jurisdictions, bringing the text of the latest legislation etc. Some
jurisdictions have specialized audio-cassette journals which bring the
busy lawyer up to date through the cassette player of
[Page 100 ]
the car on the way to his office. And the advertisements
announcing new legislation in newspapers or other mass media are also,
of course, typical current awareness systems, though addressed to the
layman rather than to the lawyer.
Interestingly, computerized current awareness systems have been
launched, mainly in the United Kingdom, where both the Infolex and
Lawtel services under Prestel, is designed as stop-gaps to give the
lawyer information on what has developed after the last edition of a
conventional information service, or, indeed, the last update of his
"conventional" computerized service.
There are, however, true examples of document designed for current
awareness. Many case reporters have a newsletter included, in which
the editor sums up the highlights of the most recent cases. As this
newsletter represents some of the same cases represented otherwise in
the reports, the corresponding parts of the newsletter is part of the
logical document representing these cases in the information system -
a part of the document especially designed to support the current
awareness function. At least one computerized service, WESTLAW,
includes a weekly newsletter for its subscribers.
Current awareness functions are, in conventional systems, almost a
by-product of the fact that the subscriber receives regulary updates,
which he browses through in order to familiarize himself with current
developments. It is perhaps somewhat surprising to see that this is a
function lacking in most computerized systems: for instance, the user
cannot by a command to the system have access to all documents added
to the data base of the last update. The computerized system is not
designed in such a way that current awareness becomes a by-product of
the updating, and one would have considered it as rather self evident
to introduce a special feature which would be the equivalent of the
current awareness function in conventional systems. Though few good
examples of this are known, there are systems which allow ranking of
documents by date, a facility which may be used for the current
awareness function. The solution for computerized services would be a
function of the system rather than a feature of document design.
[Page 101 ]
As mentioned above, the current awareness function is not regarded
as a major function on the level of document design, but rather as an
objective of specialized information systems. In a discussion on
functional performance, we shall not in general address the current
awareness function of document design. We shall, however, return to
some of the same points in our discussion on passive use of
legal information systems.
3.3.4 Conclusion
In this section, we have discussed some of the basic properties of
legal retrieval systems in the perspective of document design,
relating the functions of a retrieval system to the design and
properties of the documents of that system. Obviously the discussion
has been rather brief compared to the complexity of the subject.
Nevertheless, we do feel that the perspective offered in this section
is important, and that it supplements the following discussions
concentrating on the functions of the retrieval mechanism and other
features of computerized systems. As emphasized initially, the
performance of a computerized system is contained within the limits
determined by the document design.
We have related three typical forms of documents to the functions
of an information system. As a conclusion, we may maintain that each
of these types of documents have their strongest advantages in respect
to one of the functions, illustrated by fig 3/5.
Fig 3/5 - Document types and system functions
| |
Retrieval | Relevance
| Source |
| |
function | function | function |
| Indexes | x |
|
|
| Abstracts | | x |
|
| Authentic text | | | x |
The conclusion indicated by fig 3/5 is hardly controversial. It
should be easily agreed that efficient retrieval must be based on
indexes, that abstracts solve the relevance function in a convenient
way, and
[Page 102 ]
that authentic texts are necessary for satisfying the source
function. The discussion is related primarily to what type of indexes
are the most efficient and how they should be produced, what type of
abstracts are most appropriate and how the authentic text should be
made available.
As part of the Common Market user survey of legal information
systems, an assessment related to that in fig 3/5 was made, and this
may be a useful supplement to the conclusion. We have not made a
distinction between documents demanding "low" or "high intellectual
effort", but this distinction does not need special comments. One
should also note that "summaries" (in our terminology "abstracts") and
"fulltext." (in our terminology "authentic text") is specified as
satisfying the retrieval function - this implies that indexes are
produced automatic on the basis of these types of documents, and in a
text retrieval system.
Fig 3/6 - Document design and system functions, cfr
Technical Study I 1977:127.
| |
Retrieval |
Relevance Assessment |
Final DP-output |
Problem Solving |
| |
H |
L |
H |
L |
E |
D |
|
| Document Characteristics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| References |
|
|
|
|
x |
|
|
| Keywords and others |
x |
|
x |
|
|
|
|
| Summaries |
|
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
| Fulltext |
|
x |
|
x |
|
x |
x |
H = high intellectual effort
L = low intellectual effort
E = originals easy accessible
D = originals difficult accessible
This table gives the same general assessment as above and in fig
3/4. It is produced as guidelines for an information system. One will
see that retrieval based on an index constructed by intellectual
indexing is presumed to tax the user more than on an index produced by
abstracts or authentic text. It may be confusing that relevance
assessment is specified as more burdensome on the basis of abstracts
than authentic
[Page 103 ]
text, but this is explained by relevance assessment being more
simple or final (though perhaps demanding more resources in research
time) on the basis of the authentic text. The column "Final DP-Output"
specifies some of the relations to other systems. If the authentic
text is easily available through other systems, the computerized
system may be limited to give a reference as to where the authentic
text may be found.
[Page 104 ]
3.4 The information system
3.4.1 Elements of the information system
The information system is the bridge between editor and user in the
communication process. In general terms, any information system may be
described as consisting of three elements, in addition to the sender
(editor) and receiver (user, lawyer). These three elements may be
described most conveniently in relation to the user.
The user will have a legal problem to solve, and will initiate the
communication process by formulating a search request, cfr
above at sect 2.5. This search request is formulated within the
restraints of the search language of the information system in
question. The request may take the form of specifying indexing terms
for look-up in the back-of-the-book index of a case reporter, it may
be an oral request made by telephone to the local library where books
of interest may be found, or it may be a request formulated with
Boolean operators for retrieval by a computerized system.
If the search request is accepted, the information system engage
its retrieval mechanism, yielding references to the user. In the
back-of-the-book index, this may be references to the cases by the
indexing terms, in the library it may be the return call from the
librarian explaining which books have been identified and, in the
computerized system, it may be a response identifying which documents
satisfy the Boolean argument. The retrieval mechanism may be designed
and function very differently, and is exemplified, in the examples
given above, by an index look-up, a librarian's use of library
information systems, and the computer programs of a text retrieval
system. The retrieval mechanism does also define the valid form of the
search request - for example the search language. There is a close
correspondence between the search request and the retrieval mechanism.
[Page 105 ]
As noted, the result is a number of documents - or document
elements - being made available to the user. These documents may,
through the reference in an index, be an abstract or the authentic
text of the source. It may, however, be only a reference, and the user
has to employ an auxiliary system to secure the authentic text of the
case. Actually, the use of a citation index may have been the occasion
for the telephone call by a lawyer to the law library, in order to get
a photocopy of a case not available in his private library. The
communicated document is a selection, the criteria of the
selection being implied by the search request.
After this short and general sketch of an information system, we
shall look into a few particulars. Information systems will not,
however, be discussed in detail at this stage. The reason is simply
that in part II we shall discuss in a more detailed and technical
approach a special type of information system, the text retrieval
system, which is of a special interest within the context of this
book.
3.4.2 Information - and on what
(1) The concept of information
It is not actually necessary in this book to introduce the
technical definition of "information", but it may be useful to make
the point in order to avoid some confusion which may be caused by all
the different meanings in which this term is currently used.
In most legal contexts, the word "information" is used loosely as a
term which may be a synonym for - for instance - "data" or "news" or
"reports" etc. In information science, the word is used with a more
specific meaning, but here also definitions vary according to the
pragmatics of the use. However, two main definitions may be discerned.
The first is based on the communication theory formulated by
Shannon in 1948. According to this theory, information is defined in
terms of the probability of the occurrence of a certain event or the
reception of a certain message. The less probability of the
[Page 106 ]
occurrence of the event or the reception of the message, the
higher information contained by the event or that message. Thus the
information contained by rare characters like "+" or "x" will be
higher than the information contained by commonplace characters like
"," or "e". The same would apply to words like "dolus" or "copyright"
compared to words like "the" or "for".
By way of illustration, one may refer to the well-known game, in
which one person thinks of a word, and the others are to guess that
word letter by letter. If the word is "lawyer", it would probably take
a number of guesses to determine the first letter "I"; to determine
the next letter "a" would be quite a bit easier. And if one had
proceeded as far as "lawy", the completion of the word by the last two
letters would be trivial.
The concept of information in communication theory is mentioned
only to stress that this concept is quite formal, and only loosely
connected with the intuitive meaning implied by everyday use.
Communication theory is concerned with signs and their formal
properties. It is not appropriate for our context. Here "information"
should be given a semantic rather than a syntactic interpretation.
In information and computer science, "information" is usually taken
as "knowledge or new knowledge". It is usual to distinguish between
"data" and "information". In order for data to be transformed into
information, it has to be received and understood by someone. As long
as these two conditions are not fulfilled, the data remains a
collection of characters and are not transformed into knowledge.
A simple example borrowed from Abramson (1963:2) may clarify the
relationship. The phrase "le soleil brille" will yield information
only to some readers. Firstly, the reader actually has to read the
phrase (communication), and secondly he must be able to understand
French (understanding). A more juridical example may be offered. In
everyday speech the words "domicile" and "residence" are perhaps
synonyms, but to a private international lawyer the words will have
different implications. Both words will, however, yield information to
the layman as well as to the lawyer.
[Page 107 ]
Defining the concept of "information" in this way, it becomes
relative and subjective. Different individuals will, due to their
differing backgrounds and knowledge, understand differently identical
sets of data, and consequently have different information communicated
to them by the same data.
For our discussion, this concept would seem appropriate. It is easy
to integrate into the sketchy model of the legal decision process
(presented in chapter 2) the "arguments" derived from legal sources
(ie a type of data) as being one type of "information" communicated by
these sources.
Further refinements of the definition could be produced, but the
main point is to underscore that "information" should be regarded as a
process of understanding, ie as some perceptive activity in the mind
of a reader.
Actually, there are a number of terms which are rather
closely related to the idea of "information". The term "sign" is a
very general term, denoting any symbol which may be associated with
meaning. A typical sign is a letter or a number, but a sign may also
be a sentence, an action, a picture etc (Stamper 1973:18). What is to
be qualified as a sign in a given situation, will then depend upon the
pragmatics of the situation. The word "signal" is nearly a synonym for
"sign", perhaps most frequently used for transient sign like an
electrical signal or a light signal. In psychology, the words "sign"
and "signal" are often used with the same meaning as the word
"stimulus", cf the wide interpretation of "sign" noted above.
The word "data" is used in a way akin to the word "sign".
By "data" one does, however, often imply that the data may be
transformed into information - data is potential information, while a
sign (for instance a single letter out of context) is not necessarily
intended to convey information.
Such terminology offers a simple three-level structure:
data (which is potential information), information and relevant
information. When data takes the form of a text, the transition from
[Page 108 ]
data to information for a reader is trivial and easily
understood. This effortless transition from data to information may
make the distinction rather superfluous for most legal discussions. It
would nevertheless seem that this distinction is productive in the
perspective of the legal communication and decision processes.
Without going into detail, it should be stressed that
there are some inherent problems in the definition (or rather:
characterization) given above. For instance, it should be noted that
old information is also information. Langefors (1970:59) defines
information as "any kind of knowledge or message than can be used to
improve, or make possible a decision", relating the concept to the
traditional definition of information as "data of value in decision
making" (Yovits/Ernst 1967:280). There would seem to be a problem of
defining something as "information" when no decision has to be taken -
even when "decision" is given a rather wide and vague meaning, similar
to "making up one's mind". The attempts to phrase definitions should,
however, be assessed for the use made of these definition. For the
purpose of this book the simple definition presuming information to be
data communicated and understood, will suffice.
(2) The subject of information
The legal information system is supposed to supply the lawyer with
information relevant to his problems. This information is of a legal
nature - and an explanation of what this may imply, is given in sect
2.6 above. The information to be conveyed by legal information system
is the same type of information which may be derived from legal
sources.
In order to make a point, one may consider at a type of system
which is more similar to those usually discussed in the literature of
computerized information systems. We may imagine an information system
supporting a plumber in his selection of cobber pipes. The plumber has
a huge store of such pipes. The pipes are stored in such a way that on
each shelf
[Page 109 ]
there are only pipes of one length and one diameter. Each shelf
is numbered. The plumber has an information system which is a
conventional card index. On the card there are data on the diameter
and length of the pipes. The cards are sorted on diameter. If the
plumber needs a tube with certain properties, he looks up his index on
the diameter he needs, and ascertain whether suitable lengths are
available. If such a pipe is found, he may ask his assistant to take a
trip to the store and collect a length of pipe from a shelf identified
with a number.
Transferring this example to a legal environment, the plumber is
replaced by a lawyer who is preparing his case before the court. He
would like to have a precedent to support his arguments on a certain
point. He turns to his legal information system, retrieves a reference
to a certain case and asks his para-legal secretary to copy the
appropriate case report.
The comparison demonstrates the differences in the situation of the
plumber and the lawyer.
Firstly, it is easy to see that the plumber, when designing his
information system, is in a better position to predict which criteria
should be taken into consideration: length and diameter may be obvious
choices. The lawyer has a more difficult task - he will hardly be able
to predict in respect to what future problems he may want to retrieve
a certain case.
Secondly, the relevance assessment is rather different in the two
situations. The assessment of the plumber is simple while the lawyer
will often have a hard task interpreting a case before deciding
whether arguments derived from that case have relevance, and their
relative weight.
These two aspects relates to basic differences in the two
situations. The information retrieval of the plumber is "fact
retrieval", that of the lawyer is "interest retrieval" - and these two
types of information situations imply different requirements for the
information systems.
Fact retrieval is, as the name implies, a search for
facts: a specified type of information (names, numbers, volumes) or a
certain document (a
[Page 110 ]
letter specified by reference number, a bill etc). In
fact retrieval the relevance assessment is absolute. There is only one
correct response, and this is independent of the user making the
search. Consequently, requirements for relevance may be stated prior
to the search itself. Interest retrieval is searching for references
or identification of documents which discuss or explain a certain
problem. It is more complex than fact retrieval, and the relevance
assessment is relative to the user. Legal information retrieval for
solving legal problems is a typical example of interest retrieval.
In this context, one may also point to another interesting
difference. In the information system of the plumber, there is an
evident and unproblematic distinction between the pipes themselves and
the description of the pipes found on the indexing cards. The legal
information retrieval system lacks this obvious distinction - it is a
gradual distinction between the authentic text of the legal source and
document elements describing the legal source.
In sect 3.1 we distinguished between the authentic text of the
source as an element of the document, and such additional elements
which were designed by the editor. The additional elements are
generally designed to satisfy the relevance or retrieval functions,
and are typically descriptions of the source. But elements in
the authentic text itself may be descriptions: The titles of a
statute, for instance, are part of the authentic text and are
important in interpreting the statute, but are also
descriptions of statutes, chapters or sections.
In this way information in a legal information system will have two
different types of information as subject. Partly it will be
information on legal norms as found in the legal sources, and partly
it will be information on the legal sources as found especially in the
additional document elements. It is not necessary, only
characteristic, that both types of information is communicated within
the same legal information system.
The descriptions of the legal sources represent some sort of a way
station on the road from a defined legal problem to the legal norms,
which have to be
[Page 111 ]
related to legal sources. The descriptions do not give the lawyer
information which can be utilized directly as a legal argument. They
serve as a basis for a temporary decision: Whether the authentic text
of the source should be consulted. This intermediate decision is
analogous to the decision of the plumber sending his assistant for a
length of copper tubing. In the actual legal argument the source may
not be utilized until the next stage. And similarly the plumber will
utilize the pipe in his work (if he does not discard the pipe as
"non-relevant" due to bends or discoloration).
Being aware of this double nature of a legal information system, it
causes no real problems for terminology or reasoning. But without this
clarification one may have problems in coping with what is really the
subject of the information conveyed by legal information systems. And
perhaps one will also be somewhat more cautious in applying the
reasoning developed in respect to other types of information systems.
[Page 112 ]
3.5 Using the information system
3.5.1 User-constructed information systems
Definitions of information systems vary according to the context in
which they are discussed. In the literature on computerized legal
information systems, the definition of a "system" usually pivots on a
provider of a service; a centre, a publisher or some
organization. Thus, it is usual to describe ITALGIURE, EUROLEX, LEXIS
etc as systems.
In this perspective, a legal information system has one provider
and a number of users or subscribers. Features of the system, like
data base content or updating response and frequency, are quite well
defined. The data base of the ITALGIURE at a given date consists, for
instance, of the documents stored in its various text files.
But as for other system concepts, one may amend the definition for
different purposes, adapting it to highlight other aspects in the
relationship between the provider and the user of a service. An
obvious alternative would be to let the definition pivot on the user
rather than the provider. In this perspective, a legal information
system has one user and a number of different providers.
This may be a perspective well suited to bring out some features of
the information situation of the user, and this situation is, of
course, essential for an understanding of how legal information
systems work within a jurisdiction.
In the perspective of the user, providers offer information
services of which he may make take advantage - at a certain price.
These services will be of different nature, from newsletters through
journals and case reporters to monographs and, of course, on-line
retrieval systems.
The user will see these offers as potential building-blocks for his
own information environment.
[Page 113 ]
He will choose according to costs and to his perceived information
needs, and in this way patch together a self-constructed information
system.
This will be a heterogenous system, composed of services based on
different technology, from the conventional paper-based systems to,
possibly, the advanced computerized services. The homogeneity of
information systems typical in a definition pivoting on the provider
is lost and, consequently, many of the concepts used to describe an
information system must be restated. For instance, how is the data
base of such a system to be defined? Is the university library part of
the data base of the user-constructed system of an academic lawyer?
Not only will this system be a patchwork composed by the individual
user, but individual users will hardly compose the same patchwork.
Even lawyers specialized within the same field will probably choose to
design their own crazy quilt of an information system that are
different in most details.
The provider-oriented information system is common for a number of
users, and may therefore be discussed as a matter of general interest.
The user-designed system, however, will be specific in relation to the
individual user. Consequently, a general discussion of any such
particular system is not desirable, one should rather try to develop
some way of discussing characteristics of these systems.
Within the frame of this tentative sketch of user-constructed legal
information systems the possible use of such a theory will be
indicated. But this tentative nature of the sketch is also some sort
of disclaimer in respect to the details drawn.
Ideas basic to this sketch were first presented by Bing
1979, and have been considerably developed by Bing 1982 and 1983.
[Page 114 ]
3.5.2 Availability factors
(1) Introduction
The use of any information service is associated with costs. It is
obvious when the user subscribes to a journal or a computerized
service: the user is then billed for the subscription fee. This is
perhaps less obvious, but still evident, when the user browses through
his own files or look up references in a compilation of statute law.
In this case the cost is associated with the expenditure of time.
"Availability factors" is the - perhaps somewhat inelegant - term
chosen to describe any circumstance associated with the use of an
information system causing costs for the user, mainly costs in terms
of money or time.
The concept is borrowed from Blekeli (1974:30-32), and
has been used roughly in this sense in prior studies, for instance
Bing/Harvold 1977:22-24 and Bing 1979. Availability factors are
related to some of Cleverdon's (1967) "performance criteria",
especially that sub-set qualified as "operations-oriented criteria"
("response time", "user effort" and "form of output"). It may be
argued that "response time" and "form of output" are only two of the
possible specifications of the third and more general criterion, "user
effort". Lancaster (1977:312- 321) does not use the concept of
"availability factors", but is concerned with "accessability",
especially in respect to libraries and the physical access to material
in a library.
Below, two different categories of availability factors are
discussed. It may be noted, however, that the costs gererated by the
factors will also be of two different types.
Some costs are associated with maintaining the user-
constructed legal information systems. These costs will be
subscription fees, salaries to staff responsible for filing or
categorizing material, costs for furnishing the library and renting
space for it, costs of terminal, microform readers or other acquired
equipment etc.
[Page 115 ]
These maintenance costs are not associated with any single
case of the user, but with the pre-problem stage in which the user
prepares for problem solving. When a case comes along, part of the
maintenance costs will have to be assigned to that case. In the most
simple example the amount to be assigned will be a division of the
maintenance cost over a period of time by the probable number of cases
within the same period. More realistic, a user will diversify
according to the type of case, and take account of the current
interest rate. And obviously, general costs related to other aspects
of his business would have to be similarly distributed - like salaries
to secretaries, office rent etc.
Other costs are related to the work on each case. The user may
spend hours in the library searching for relevant literature, and
telecommunication costs and fees for accessing computerized data bases
may escalate.
These are variable costs which will vary from one case to
another. The variable costs of a case will have to be added to the
calculated fraction of maintenance costs to determine the costs of
information retrieval for that case.
The maintenance costs, as a rule, may be quite easy to determine.
The variable costs, generally, will be quite difficult to discern from
the general work on the case. Some costs are quite easy to identify:
the cost information printed out after a terminal session may simply
be included in the client's account. But it is difficult to separate a
lawyer's time in "finding the law" and "analysis of the law". Research
and analysis are probably iterative and interdependent activities, and
are hardly to be generally distinguished.
There are studies which claim to do this, for instance
Lang 1972:65 ("finding law" and "analysis to determine relevance") and
Gluek 1976:83 ("Informationssuche" and "Informationsverarbeitung").
See also Erikstad 1979:62-69 where a terminal session for legal
information retrieval was divided into "relevance assessment" and
"giving commands and search arguments". Such distinctions may be of
interest for special purposes, but in
[Page 116 ]
principle on should be wary of attempts to quantify
processes which, analytically, can hardly be separated.
These general problems do not, however, create any major
difficulties of discussing in principle the costs of information
retrieval for a case - although it demonstrates that such a discussion
will have to be somewhat theoretical - and that there may be severe
difficulties associated with attempts to determine exactly which part
of general maintenance and variable costs are to be qualified as
relevant.
(2) Pragmatic and formal availability factors
Availability factors may be classified in different ways, but there
is one distinction which is quite important - that between pragmatic
and formal availability factors.
Pragmatic factors are those discussed in the introductory
section: the costs associated with purchases and fees, expenditure of
time and money to access and use information systems. There are
numerous different pragmatic factors.
An interesting, though trivial factor is distance. The costs
associated with using a certain information service are related to the
distance from the user to the place where that service may be
accessed. This distance is an availability factor, only to be overcome
through incurring costs - the user spends time going to the files in
the neighbouring room, the next floor or the local library; the user
has to wait for a mailed request to reach a documentation center, etc.
It may be offered as some sort of universal law of the use of legal
sources that the frequency by which the source is accessed is directly
related to the distance between the user's desk and the point of
access.
Pragmatic factors may have the common characteristic of being
overcome by the expenditure of costs. By allocating sufficient
resources, a user may always have the information made available in
spite of severe pragmatic availability factors.
[Page 117 ]
Not so in respect to formal availability factors. These are
circumstances which determine the access to information services, but
which cannot be overcome by incurring costs.
A typical example is the formal availability factor of the law of
confidentiality. In many jurisdictions, the decisions by public
authorities are a source of law - a new decision must always take into
consideration the result of prior decisions. But these decisions will
generally incorporate personal information on the clients subject to
the decisions. And such information will very often be protected by
confidentiality. The lawyers working within that agency will have
access to former decisions, and may argue on the basis of such
decisions - which may be cited in an anonyminized form. But a lawyer
representing a client is denied access to the files containing the
prior decisions, and cannot utilize this important source of law in
his own legal argument. And this availability factor cannot be
overcome by incurring additional costs - it is normative, and may not
be removed by user effort.
(3) User research on availability factors: An example
As "availability factors" has not been a concept directly utilized
in any user research (perhaps with the exception of Karnov 1978), one
cannot expect to find empirical results directly related to this
concept, setting out, for instance, which availability factors are of
greatest practical importance. But several studies characterize more
indirectly the availability factors in the information environment of
the user.
In the major German study, Jungjohann/Seidel/Soergel/Uhlig 1974:49,
is listed the most frequent causes for the "verspaetete oder
ausbleibende Information". This may be regarded as some sort of
ranking of availability factors. Four causes are identified which each
explains more that 10 per cent of the cases, the sum of these four
causes explaining more than three quarters of the examples in which
information is belated or missing.
[Page 118 ]
Fig 3/7 - Causes for missing information
| Zeitmangel | 33 % |
| Zeitraum zwischen Enstscheidung und Veroeffentlichung zu lang | 21 % |
| Literaturbestand nicht ausreichend | 13 %
|
| Verzoegerung der Umlaeufe | 10 % |
This table has several interesting features. For instance, the main
cause - "lack of time" - may cover two entirely different situations.
The first situation may be one when the user has too little time
available to make adequate efforts to research the law - a situation
common, for instance, in overworked public agencies. The cause is here
related to the general job situation rather than to information
systems. But it may also cover the situation in which the response
time of the information system is too long for the user - for instance
a lawyer working against the deadlines set by the court - to be able
to profit from the use of the system. In that case, the cause is
clearly related to the information system. It may be argued that "lack
of time" is too general a cause to be very useful in an analysis of
the information situation of the user - it only implies that the user
lacks resources, and does not explain why resources are lacking, or
what types of resources are lacking.
Similar general causes may be found in other studies of user
research, for instance in Karnov's careful study of Danish lawyers,
where one of the conclusions (1978:30-31) is that the major difficulty
perceived by the Danish lawyer is the large volume of literature which
is too difficult to accessible. Again, this is rather too general to
help understand in detail what are the problems of the users.
The second cause identified by the German study - the lapse of time
between a decision and its publishing - is not an availability factor,
but rather a criticism of the information services offered. It may be
of interest to note that the Danish study (Karnov 1978:30-31)
identified as the second major cause of defects in the user's
information situation that the relevant sources were not "officially
published" - a cause which seems related to the one mentioned in the
German study.
[Page 119 ]
The third is, however, a typical availability factor - namely
defects in the library. Such defects have to be repaired by
supplementing the library by out-of-house services, which may
obviously cause delays. Similarly the last of the four German causes
is a typical availability factor - the time for journals etc on
circulation to reach the user.
In this context, the analysis of available user studies will not be
pursued in order to demonstrate that they may disclose further
information on which availability factors are of importance to the
lawyer. Further examples will, however, be given in the following
sections. For general discussions, see Bing 1982:164-171 and
Bing/Frøystad 1982.
3.5.3 The cost curve
(1) Area of interest - area of documentation
Above in sect 3.5.2, availability factors were briefly discussed as
circumstances causing costs for the user in acquiring or accessing
legal information services. It was also mentioned that these costs may
be divided into maintenance and variable costs.
Looking to the maintenance costs, these are most closely related to
the user-constructed information system. Obviously, this information
system is not designed by accident. The user has some sort of
motivation in acquiring or subscribing to a certain service.
A user, in general, will have some idea as to what future problems
he may be required to respond. These are problems which correspond to
his specialization or office, and may be described as his area of
interest. When assessing possible information services, the user
will try to prepare for his future work, and obviously try to find
services which are useful in respect to his perceived area of
interest.
Any information service offered, will have a documentation
area, cfr sect 3.2.2 above.
Taken together, the selection criteria of a certain
[Page 120 ]
provider-oriented legal information system define the
documentation area of that system. The user may describe his area of
interest by corresponding criteria (though this is rarely done very
consciously).
When acquiring legal information services, one may picture the
initial assessment of the user as an attempt to identify and acquire
information services with documentation areas overlapping his area of
interest. By adding one service to another, the documentation areas of
the services provide an overlay on the area of interest. Only if the
user represents a typical user - for instance a dedicated tax
lawyer - he may expect to find information systems which match exactly
his area of interest to their area of documentation. More generally
the user will have to find several systems of which the union of
documentation areas provide sufficient coverage for his area of
interest.
But the matching of areas of documentation to the area of interest
is only part of the assessment made by the lawyer. Certainly another
part of his consideration would be the rank of the documented legal
sources. For a tax specialist, a compilation of statutes in force may
have a general documentation area. But on the other hand, statutes
have such a high rank in a legal system that any lawyer will require
easy access to them. The lack of concord between documentation and
interest areas is compensated by the rank (or importance) of the
documented type of legal sources.
Thus may be indicated the "rational" behaviour of a user of legal
information services. He will consider his area of interest. He will
survey the information services offered, and try to match the
documentation areas of these services to his own area of interest. In
doing this matching, he will attempt to select systems whose composite
documentation areas provide an acceptable coverage of his area of
interest. And he will consider the type of legal sources documented,
in order to have satisfactory acccess to those of a high rank.
[Page 121 ]
(2) The local data base: The concept of coverage
Provider-oriented information systems have well-defined data bases
while the user-constructed information systems do not, as the systems
themselves are not very well-defined. It is a system problem to
determine where the user-constructed system stops and its environment
begins.
This is a practical, though in most cases, a trivial problem. For
instance in a university, the professors will acquire some books and
journals for their personal use - but will rely mainly on the
university library. This library may be a national library,
distributed throughout the country and linked to other national
libraries. Obviously the professor's information system should be
considered larger than that represented by the books and journals in
his own shelves - but equally obviously not all-embracing. Similar
problems will arise in respect to lawyers, government agencies etc.
In this our concept of costs (derived from overcoming availability
factors) may help us. Consider the cost curve which is theoretically
drawn as the lawyer accesses new information services. The curve
starts with an initial cost calculated for the individual case on the
basis of maintenance costs. The variable costs will then make costs
grow when accessing any service.
But in our reasoning, we have pointed out that the user does not
acquire information services by chance: he acquires services thought
to be useful. The services most easily available are those services
generally considered most useful. Consequently, in most cases the user
will first employ these easily available services. Only when these do
not give the necessary information to solve the problem, the user will
move to other and less available systems.
In this way, we may argue that the curve will become progressively
steeper. It may also be argued that the curve typically will have an
"elbow", indicating the point where the user leaves those services
prepared for use by prior acquisition, and turns to other services.
This "elbow" may be regarded as a definition of what is to be
considered the local "data base" in
[Page 122 ]
the user-constructed system. This data base cannot, in contrast
to that of provider-oriented information systems, be clearly defined.
But the reference to the cost curve should provide a working
definition.
Fig 3/8 - Typical cost curve for use of information
services in an average case - elbow indicating "local data base"
User research would seem to bear out this point.
The Danish survey has a fascinating triad of responses. Three
quarters of the users maintained that the sources for which they had a
"great need" were kept easily available, ie in the same building as
the lawyer had his office (Karnov 1978:30) - illustrating the point of
user-constructed information systems being designed to match the area
of interest. The majority also maintained - in ideal correspondence
with the advice of legal theory - that the availability factor of
distance never made them refrain from collecting information from a
library outside their own office (Karnov 1978:44). On the other hand,
responding to a different question, the majority also stated that they
never or rarely based their research on legal sources made available
from the outside (Karnov 1978:43). It is tempting to maintain that
these two last responses illustrate our progressively increasing cost
curve: even though there may be a need for additional information, the
costs associated with acquiring this from outside localities are
simply too high.
[Page 123 ]
The same observation is made by Lang 1972 for Canadian lawyers
(cited from Bing/Frøystad 1982:65):
"Lawyers carry out the bulk of their research in their
own offices with the aid of law books from their office library. Rare
is the lawyer who conducts most of his research at home or at a county
court library."
We may perhaps venture to conclude that the "elbow" in the cost
curve is a definition of sorts of the "data base" of the
user-constructed information system. This "elbow" may be difficult to
determine empirically. But both the theoretical arguments and the
cited user research would seem to point to the content of the local
library - the shelves in the office of the user - as a good indication
of the nucleus of that data base.
In describing the data base of user-constructed data bases, the
concept coverage is very useful. Often coverage is used to
describe the quality of the data base of a provider-oriented data
base. In information systems, the value of high coverage is usually
emphasized (see for instance Tapper 1973:78-80).
Coverage is generally defined as "the extent to which the system
includes a data base required by the user" (McCarn/Stein 1967). Using
the two concepts introduced in sect 3.5.3 (1), one may say that high
coverage indicates a large intersection of documentation and interest
areas, and exhaustive documentation of sources within the interest
area.
Following this definition, one will find that it leads to curious
results of legal information services. Take for instance the
information service provided by a case reporter for the supreme court,
and compare the data base of this with the requirements of a
specialized tax lawyer. It is obvious that the tax experts would
require legislation, regulatory law and decisions from lower courts as
well as text books and other secondary sources. Consequently, the data
base covers only a small fraction of the "data base required by the
user" - coverage is low. But this is hardly a point of criticism, or
even of interest, in respect to the case reporter.
The much acclaimed concept of coverage does not apply
[Page 124 ]
adequately to the specialized legal information services, with
areas of documentation clearly defined in respect, for instance, to
types of legal sources. The concept was, we believe, originally
developed to characterize the quality of a library serving a
certain profession. It could also be successfully applied to describe
the data base of a global information system, claiming that its
documentation area is identical to the. area of interest of a certain
typical user situation or that of a whole profession. Because many
computerized legal information systems (as opposed to most
conventional services) claim to be general and serving any information
need of a lawyer, coverage may be a relevant measure for their data
bases.
In respect to coverage it should be stressed that this criterion is
well suited to characterize the data base of the user-constructed
information system. It may indeed be said that the aim of a user is to
construct an individual information system with an optimal coverage.
The point has also a reverse aspect: the concept of coverage is of
little interest in relation to specialized legal information services
- in this respect, the qualification of the area of documentation (and
some additional criteria, like the fraction of sources within this
area documented by the system), will be better suited to describe and
analyse the system.
(3) Factors determining the cost curve
No empirical data are available making it possible to determine
exactly the cost curve discussed in theory above. And certainly there
are a number of practical and fundamental problems connected with the
gaining of such empirical information. There are, however, other
possibilities for determining some of the factors influencing the
shape of the curve.
Obviously, one important factor is the size of the local data base,
or simply the local library. The larger the local data base, the
longer the segment of the curve with moderate inclination, below the
"elbow".
[Page 125 ]
In general this will clearly be related to the level of
maintenance costs. The greater maintenance costs, the larger the local
data base (as a rule of the thumb) will be gererated. And the fraction
of the maintenance costs to be assigned to the individual case, will
be correspondingly larger.
It is unrealistic to isolate the costs of information services from
the other costs related to a case. But if this is done for the sake of
argument, one will see that a user with low maintenance costs will be
able to offer advice in simple cases at a comparatively lower cost
than a user with higher maintenance costs. In difficult cases
requiring more legal research, however, the latter user will be able
to offer advice at the lower cost. This illustrates some of the
deliberations necessary for the user in determining the ambition level
of his individual information system.
Two or more users will often cooperate in maintaining a common
information system. This is the case among partners of a law firm, the
employers in a government office, the professors at a university etc.
Obviously, if each case contributes an identical fraction towards
maintenance costs (and all other factors being equal), one will
realize that an office of two partners will be able to spend twice the
amount on maintaining their service than a lawyer working on his own.
This demonstrates that as far as costs for information services is
considered an important factor in the total costs for legal services,
the larger organization is given an advantage.
Lang (1982:77) has a table in which the acceptable level
of costs for legal information retrieval services is set out. It
demonstrates that the majority of large offices are prepared to pay
more than three times as much for such services as small offices. Lang
defines small offices as those with 1-3 lawyers, and large offices as
those exceeding 10 lawyers (1972:61). When compensated for the
underlying facts, the survey does actually demonstrate that the
individual lawyer working in small offices is prepared to pay as much,
or more, as the lawyer working in the
[Page 126 ]
larger offices. Even so, the larger offices will have the
advantage of a larger local data base.
Though large organizations may maintain a larger local data base at
the same cost per case, the size of an organization probably is
another factor determining the cost curve. A larger organization
implies greater average distance from an office to the local library
or the local files, or the book or the facility desired is already in
use by a colleague, etc.
This would seem to be supported by some results of the
German user survey, see Jungjohann/Seidel/Soergel/Uhlig 1974:44. In
this survey, the users identified causes for unsatisfactory result of
information retrieval. The two factors ranked highest included
"Informationen zu verstreut" and "Literatur nicht in der Bibliothek
erhaeltlich". One should think that in a larger organization, both
causes would be relatively more severe: documents would be even more
dispersed throughout the organization, and books would be more
frequently on loan to some colleague.
Also a third factor will be related to this: the cost of searching
a large data base is generally considered to be relatively higher than
the cost of searching a smaller data base (Langefors 1970:227). As
larger organizations accumulate relatively larger local data bases,
the costs for searching these will also be higher.
According to this argument, it may be productive to distinguish
between "large" and "small" organizations (though how these should be
defined, will be relative to the country in question). Other factors
being equal, large organizations may establish relatively larger local
data bases for the same cost per case. By doing this, the large
organization creates a curve with a comparatively long segment of
modest inclination for variable costs. But nevertheless the
inclination will be steeper than that of the corresponding segment for
small organizations: the size of the organization itself and the size
of the local data base will result in a relatively steeper inclination
of the curve representing variable costs. The contrast between "small"
and "large" organizations is illustrated in fig 3/9.
[Page 127 ]
Fig 3/9 - Typical cost curves of small and large
organizations (functional performance excluded)
The factors above are not, however, the only relevant factors
forming the cost curve. Also the functional performance of the
user-constructed information systems is important. The meaning of
this concept is discussed above at sect 3.3.3 and will be discussed in
further in respect to user-constructed systems below at section 3.5.4
(2). Functional performance may be characterized as those features of
an information system which facilitate retrieval, relevance assessment
and access to the source document (retrieval, relevance and source
functions). Obviously, by establishing a library index, retrieval of
books from the library becomes more efficient. By making summaries of
in-house reports on file, it becomes easier to determine their
relevance to a problem at hand. By subscribing to a computerized
service documenting regulatory law in force, it becomes easier to have
a copy of the current form of an identified regulation.
These examples should be sufficient at this point to illustrate
what form increases in functional performance may take. Such measures
will contribute to an increase in the costs of maintaining the user-
constructed information system without a corresponding increase in
the coverage of the local data base. But these measures will bring
down the variable costs, making the first segment of the curve rise
less steeply. Whether it is "rational" to invest in such enhanced
features will be an assessment based on whether the user on the
average needs to access a volume of documents greater than that
indicated by the intersection of the curves representing the situation
with and without the enhancement.
[Page 128 ]
Fig 3/10 - Costs curves with and without enhancement of
the functional performance of the user-constructed information system
It would probably be possible to find further examples of factors
forming the cost curve. The main point of this section is not,
however, to provide an exhaustive list of such possible factors - but
rather to exemplify how the curves may assist the reasoning in respect
to features of the user-constructed information system. Such reasoning
may be useful in determining the characteristics of different user
situations, and in comparing such situations. This would seem to be
true even when the curve itself cannot be determined in detail by
empirical studies of the situation of the user.
(4) Availability discrimination
The cost curves may be used for comparing the situations of
different users. As stated above, two users will rarely have an
identical information situation: their choices in constructing their
own individual information systems will vary. Consequently, also the
cost curves will be specific to each of the users. The stressing of
differences in user situations is therefore of minor interest.
There may, however, be unjustified differences between
users, and such differences may be termed availability
discrimination.
[Page 129 ]
In order to identify availability discrimination, one has to
justify the comparison of users. A comparison would seem to be
justified if the area of interest is (approximately) identical.
One may imagine that a group of lawyers is created of all those
with an identical area of interest - for instance tax lawyers. For all
these lawyers, the cost curves are determined. Then this group is
subdivided by different criteria. If the average costs curves for the
sub-groups are clearly different, one would maintain that this is a
case of availability discrimination.
A trivial way of sub-dividing lawyers would be to have one group of
those residing and working within the capital (or larger cities), and
one group of those working elsewhere. As mentioned above under section
3.5.2 (2), geographical distance is an availability factor. It
would seem probable that the centrally situated lawyer has a better
information situation, due to smaller communication costs (both in
time and telecommunication rates), better access to central files or
libraries (Eckhoff 1971:14) etc. (On the other hand factors like the
rent of office space, salaries etc may bring total costs up.) The
discrimination of the periphery in respect to a centre is a theme from
the general policy debate in many countries, and one should not be
surprised to see this reflected also in respect to the information
situation of lawyers.
Another sub-division frequently discussed is the one between
lawyers within and outside public administration. Within, for
instance, the tax administration lawyers will have access to
information systems denied to those outside - perhaps due to the very
nature of the information in these files (see sect 3.5.2 (2) for
examples of formal availability factors). This will create a different
information environment for the two groups, which may often seem less
than justified.
A third sub-division of special interest in our context is the
group with and without local access to computerized legal
information services. A computerized service may often imply
relatively high maintenance costs, an increase in the local data base,
and
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a dramatic increase in functional performance. Referring to our
discussion at sect 3.5.3 (3), one may maintain that this sub-division
will resemble the sub-division between large and small organizations.
Also, the sub-division between large and small organizations may
correspond roughly to the sub-division between organization in and
outside cities. In this fact lies, perhaps, the core of the problem
posed by the tariff structures of some computerized services: will
they strengthen an existing availability discrimination thought to be
less than desirable? Will the potential reduction of availability
discrimination through new information technology be eliminated due
to, for instance, tariff structures confirming existing differences?
Availability discrimination is not always unjustified. The example
of geographical distance as a cause for availability discrimination is
illustrating an issue which cannot be resolved for legal information
system alone, but which has to be addressed as a general policy issue
of centralization and decentralization. Formal availability factors -
which will always create availability discrimination - may
perhaps be fully justified. But the existence of availability
discrimination - of which certainly more examples can be given than
mentioned in this section - provides a focal point for the critical
examination of legal information systems.
3.5.4 Active and passive use of information systems
(1) Introduction
When discussing legal information systems, especially computerized
systems, the interest often concentrates on the efficiency of the
system in retrieving relevant documents. The assumed situation of the
user implies a legal problem, which the user is supposed to solve.
Legal problems are solved by locating legal sources, from which
applicable norms are derived through interpretation.
This may be seen as the active use of information systems.
The active use presumes a legal problem, and the user formulates
search requests in order to
[Page 131 ]
retrieve possible relevant documents. This situation also
requires that the information systems will permit the processing of a
problem-oriented request. A text retrieval system is extremely well
designed for processing problem-oriented requests, accepting flexible
and complex queries on the same level of specification as the
documents themselves.
But there is also another typical user situation, which is often
associated with the conventional information systems - for instance a
legal journal. When receiving a new issue, the user will often browse
through the journal. This is to be expected, as the system will
typically communicate documents within his area of interest. The user
has to maintain his background knowledge to give off-the-cuff response
to clients, and to be efficient in the active use of information
systems.
This current-awareness function may be seen as a passive use
of information systems. No legal problem is being solved, the user is
only brushing up his knowledge of the law.
User research has acquired some information on passive
use of systems. It should be noted that there are indications of
conferences and conversation with colleagues playing an important role
as passive information systems (Rawlence 1975:349, Technical Study I
1977:99 and Karnov 1978:24). In general, however, journals are ranked
high for maintaining background knowledge
(Jungjohann/Seidel/Soergel/Uhlig 1974, Technical Study I 1977:99 (for
"routine use") and Karnov 1978:24-25). The studies also have a
corresponding ranking for active use. Here the journals disappear, and
information systems like compilations of statutes in force, case
reporters and commentaries to the statutes are emphasized.
One should note that different systems are designed for different
use. Journals, especially those approaching newsletters in form and
content, will be of interest mainly for passive use. Case reporters
will be used both initially for keeping track of developments
(emphasized in some jurisdictions like the US by the advance sheet
service of case reporters), and for later reference in active use.
Computerized services will rarely be used passively.
[Page 132 ]
It may be a point of criticism in respect to computerized services
that they are designed with little thought on passive use. It should,
for instance, be trivial to have a command displaying the most recent
documents which have been added to the data base as a current
awareness function. Some services do include a newsletter,
highlighting recent developments, more or less in the form of an
electronic journal. Such functions deserve more attention in respect
to computerized services, because the passive use is probably
extremely important for practising lawyers as they are often required
to give instant answers to the requests of users.
As far as we know there is no system offering a "forum function",
in which the users may discuss recent developments, pin notes for the
attention of colleagues when working on a problem etc. One would
expect the users to find such alternative and improved ways of
communicating of interest in respect to the vital part played by
inter-lawyer communication.
(2) Functional performance
The different functions will not be discussed in this context (cfr
above at sect 3.3.3).
Also the user-constructed system will have features determining
functional performance. The major characteristic of such systems,
however, is that they exploit functions imbedded in the information
services provided through subscription or purchase.
For retrieval, the user will exploit back-of-the-book indexes, text
retrieval systems, digests, citation indexes etc, which are part of
the provided services. The user will not have one uniform retrieval
system, but rather a multitude of sub-systems which he has to
manipulate in order to access his local data base. Most of the
retrieval systems will be designed to access only those documents
which are parts of the data base of one provider-oriented system: the
index of a book will give access to only that book, the index of a
case reporter will give access to only the reports published in that
reporter, a text retrieval
[Page 133 ]
system will give access only to documents in the computerized
data base, etc. The sole exceptions will be designed as more general
retrieval tools - a citation index may give access to more than one
reporter, an annotated encyclopedia may cite all major legal sources
on an item etc. But also more general retrieval tools like these will
be quite specific and will not give access to the total data base of
the user-constructed system.
This, then, will be a major defect in the user-constructed systems.
The user will have to work with a number of different retrieval
systems, with different "search languages" (the index of a case
reporter also defines some sort of search language). Only if a global
service is offered - a service whose documentation area corresponds
closely with the area of interest of the user, and with a high
coverage - will the user avoid the reduced performance and increasing
variable costs of legal research.
The user may, of course, invest in creating a retrieval function
for his individual information system with the consequences for the
cost curve indicated in sect 3.5.3. (3). User research does indicate
that lawyers will rarely establish such individual retrieval
facilities.
In the German user survey, the fourth most important
cause of unsatisfactory retrieval was given as "Unvollkommene
Suchhilfen" (Jungjohann/Seidel/Soergel/Uhlig 1974:44). The study does
not, however, specify whether the unsatisfactory research tools were
associated with the retrieval function provided in purchased
information systems, or lack of adequate retrieval tools in respect to
the user-constructed system. - In an Italian survey, Rawlence
(1975:374-375) looked into the libraries of "advocati e procurati" in
Florence, finding that 50 per cent did not have any special system in
their libraries, and 77 per cent were lacking any form of library
index. This is clearly an indication of a lack of specific retrieval
tools for the user-constructed system.
For the relevance assessment, this is also a function imbedded in
the systems purchased by the user. In respect to this function, fewer
problems will arise by the profusion of different systems. The
relevance
[Page 134 ]
assessment is made on the basis of a retrieved document, and even
if this function is solved differently in one system compared to
another, this does not create similar needs for an umbrella solution.
The same holds true for the source function. In order to access the
authentic form of a legal source, the user has to rely on services
provided to him. (With the exception of sources gererated by, for
instance, a court. This will be relevant also for future problems at
that court, and may be accessed by the users within the court through
their own files). The source function is critical to the lawyer - it
is hardly interesting for him know the existence of a probable
relevant case if the text of that case cannot be consulted. There are
some specialized providers like libraries or documentation centra
which will make the authentic form available when the source is
identified.
This brief discussion of functional performance demonstrates that
in respect to user-constructed systems, it may be that the
diversification of retrieval systems represents a defect which the
user may be able to repair by some sort of investment in the
maintenance of his own system. Computerized legal information services
generally have data bases including the union of a number of
conventional data bases (for instance a great number of volumes of
case reporters). This may increase the performance in the
user-constructed information system not only due to the more efficient
retrieval function, but also because the fragments are brought
together under one umbrella.
(3) Delegation
User resarch has disclosed a somewhat unexpected tendency to
delegate legal research. Technical Study I 1977:33 found that
intermediaries were employed frequently in respect to computerized
systems. This was considered rather discouraging, as computerized
services are designed to be used by the lawyer himself, and to give
feed-back which the lawyer is expected to utilize for instance to
reformulate his search request.
[Page 135 ]
In our context, delegation implies that the user, in respect to his
user-constructed information system, finds resources within his own
organization to do legal research, generally increasing the variable
costs. As discussed above, the user-constructed system will often
contain a number of retrieval systems. It might be especially
disturbing if found that delegation took place to a large degree in
respect to a sub-system which generally will have a high coverage and
an efficient retrieval function, like many computerized services.
But in this respect user research is not conclusive. It is true
that as a rule lawyers do not delegate research. But many of them
state that this is simply because they do not have this possibility
within their own organization - in Denmark 40 per cent, in Germany an
even greater percentage (Karnov 1978:41-42, Uhlig 1976:61). Looking at
the German survey, one will find that delegation takes place most
frequently for lawyers in public service for senior staff, and for
lawyers in private practice working in "large organizations" (Uhlig
1976:62).
Obviously the results may be interpreted as showing that when the
organization offers the possibility for delegation, the lawyer will
use this possibility quite frequently in order to increase the
resources put into legal research. The salaries of such staff may be
considered part of the maintenance costs of the user-constructed
system, making the assessment of whether their employment is
"rational" similar to that indicated in sect 3.5.3 (3). Alternatively
the time spent by intermediaries on legal research may be seen as a
variable cost related to the individual case.
Also, it would seem probable that computerized information systems
are initially subscribed to by the very same organizations which have
resources for delegation. The emergence of intermediaries would then
be only a repetition of a general theme rather than something special
for computerized systems - though the focus and analysis of these
systems would have made such intermediaries more visible.
It is also probable that activities relating to the source function
are widely delegated - for instance
[Page 136 ]
through the copying of a source text or by other practical steps
taken to secure the authentic text in an appropriate form for the "end
user". On the other hand, relevance assessment would probably be
carried out mainly by the "end user" himself, or at least delegation
would here play a different role. It might be interesting to see user
surveys concentrate on the different activities within user
organizations, for instance to assess the changes implied by the
growing group of "para-legals" working with lawyers within many
jurisdictions.
3.5.5 Technological change and costs
In closing, one may employ some of the arguments presented above in
order to discuss the situation in which a user purchases a
computerized legal information service. For the user-constructed
information system, the access to a computerized service will have
several implications.
The first effect will be an extended local data base. Obviously the
degree of extention will vary. For some users, the computerized
service will greatly extend the data base into documentation areas
quite beyond their primary area of interest. For other users, the data
base will be identical mainly to the local data base already existing.
By concentrating on these two ends of a spectrum, one will see that
for the first group, the main motivation will lie in an access to a
larger local data base, while the second group will subscribe to the
service only if the more efficient computerized system brings down the
costs for legal research.
Evaluating the cost curve, a subscription to a computerized service
will generally imply an increase in maintenance costs. This will be
due partly to the purchase of local equipment (terminals, printers,
modems) and partly to a flat subscription rate of the service (a
minimum fee or similar rate). The absolute increase is difficult to
assess, and is certainly relative to the situation of the user. If the
service presumes the purchase of dedicated terminals and printers, the
investment may be relatively high compared to the general maintenance
costs of the user's
[Page 137 ]
total system. But if the user has already word processing
equipment (even at his own desk), and this may be used for retrieval,
the upgrading may be quite marginal. As a rule, one must presume
somewhat increased maintenance costs, even if the computerized service
replaces one or more conventional systems to which the user formerly
subscribed.
The effect on variable costs is more difficult to assess, and
should be considered from two angles.
Firstly, one should consider situations in which the computerized
system greatly increases the local data base. If the computerized
system is very general, an increase will often be the result. For a
"rational" user, this will be attractive if his area of interest is
wide. A general practising lawyer may have specialities, but usually
he has to tackle problems across the whole range of the legal system.
For practical purposes, his local data base composed of conventional
services will have to be rather limited compared to his area of
interest - his coverage will not be too high. To this lawyer, it would
be tempting to have a general computerized service made available and
thus greatly increase the local data base. The effect would mainly be
an extension of that segment of the cost curve which has a modest
inclination. Whether this segment become slightly steeper through the
purchase of the computerized service, would probably not be decisive.
Secondly one should consider situations where the user is highly
specialized. Then the computerized service offering a local data base
completely outside the user's area of interest would not be
attractive. But if this user were offered a system with improved
functional performance, this might bring down the variable costs. So
even without increasing the local data base within his area of
interest, the use of information systems for this data base could
actually prove to be cheaper.
This indicates two typical user situations which are both
characterized mainly in terms of the area of interest. A general
practising lawyer may be offered as an example of a user with a
general and often vaguely defined area of interest. He would be
tempted by a computerized service offering an increase in the local
data base. A government agency may be offered
[Page 138 ]
as an example of a specialized user. This agency would be tempted
by a system bringing down the variable costs of legal research.
Actually a government agency frequently has an information
situation with a relatively steep variable cost curve. This is because
the organization often relatively large, the local data base extensive
and the functional performance in the user-constructed system rather
poor. The two latter observations are related to the fact that in many
agencies, their own prior decisions represent an important legal
source, but available through by indexes which have to be kept up to
date by manual and cumbersome means. By making the same data base
available through a computerized system, the variable costs in
researching the files may be brought down. Also the increased
maintenance cost is a question of budget rather than of profitable
investment. It may indeed be maintained that many European systems
have started out within public agencies mainly for this reason.
It is a matter of discussion whether a computerized service
actually will bring down variable costs for retrieval, or the average
costs for legal research (the sum of maintenance and variable costs
for an average case).
In his detailed analysis of the then proposed German JURIS system,
Gluek (1976:84-85, 91 and 94) estimated a reduction of manhours per
user in public administration of 1.4 hours and in lawyer firms of 1.7
hours.
The probable cost reduction from increased functional performance
will have to be set against the additional variable costs from use of
the information retrieval services (fees to the service providers,
which are generally time-related).
Such a comparison would also be difficult to make, as user
behaviour probably will change when a new information system is
introduced. As mentioned above (sect 3.5.2 (3)), "lack of time" is a
major cause for not using information services. If this is due to the
restraints in the situation of the user, a more efficient information
system may result in easing the frustration of not being able to
research the cases adequately while the same amount of time per case
is used for such research. The result will not be a
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reduction of costs for legal research, but more adequate research
within the same cost restraints.
To produce a detailed calculation of probable savings in terms of
time and money through the introduction of a computerized service will
therefore be difficult, mainly because of lack of necessary insight
into the new system's influence on user behaviour. Perhaps assessments
could be made more easily by the rule-of-the-thumb-principle
introduced in the beginning of this section - estimating whether a
potential user is characterized mainly by a general or a specialized
area of interest, and considering the impact which an additional
computerized service will have on his user-constructed information
systems - both in terms of local data base and functional performance.
[Page 140 ]
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